


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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
CANADA AND THE THREE MID-EAST CRISES

by



HOWARD ALFRED LEESON

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and
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ABSTRACT

While a substantial amount of academic research has been done on Canadian external relations, the bulk of it has been concentrated on relationships between Canada and specific western states. This has been especially true in the case of Canadian-American relations. For the most part this research has attempted to assess the impact of large powers on the domestic and foreign policies of Canada. Relatively less concern has been shown for the problems of Canadian political positions vis-a-vis "non-major" powers, and the influences affecting these policy orientations.

In order to partially fill this gap this thesis will examine Canadian policy with regard to the Middle East concentrating on the three crises of 1947-48, 1956, and 1967. It is during these crises that Canadian foreign policy involvement is most extensive, resulting in a number of decisive policy decisions.

Besides providing an overview of the crises, the policy changes and continuity of Canadian involvement, the study also examines both internal and external policy determinants. Emphasis has been placed on the external factors such as the situational setting in the Middle East and the pressures brought to bear on Canadian policy decisions by the major western states.

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INTRODUCTION

It is well established that Canadian foreign policy concerns have been both qualitatively and quantitatively different since World War II. Prior to that time Canada played a very minor role in world affairs, being content to allow the great powers to handle decisions which did not directly affect her. Since World War II however, Canada has participated in many important decisions, usually through her role in the United Nations. While this fact has been noted many times little has been done to systematically analyze Canadian policy toward areas which prior to 1945 were of little concern to this country, and almost no attempt has been made to integrate these policies with the broad perspective of Canadian foreign policy.

One way to begin such a systematic analysis is to select a case study involving what appears to be the formulation of policy toward an area not previously considered by the Canadian government. Such an area is the Middle East. Only after World War II did Canada begin to evolve a policy toward this area. Most Canadians are aware of the role played by Canada during the Suez crisis of 1956, but less well understood is the role Canada took in the decisions of 1947-48, and 1967. When integrated, these three crises should provide an analytically sound case study of Canadian policy formation.

This study will be concerned primarily with uncovering

and analyzing the part played by Canada in all three crises and examining the continuity of Canadian policy on specific issues of crucial importance to the Middle East. A great deal of historical work has been done regarding the Canadian part in the 1956 Suez crisis, but very little on the 1947-48 crisis, and less yet on 1967. A good deal of this thesis will thus be concerned with a description of the events, using Canadian government documents, public speeches, United Nations documents, newspapers, and other pertinent and available secondary materials.

Beyond this description there are several questions which will be answered. To do this the study will be divided into four parts. Chapters one, two and three will describe and analyze the Canadian participation in the United Nations decisions of 1947-48, 1956, and 1967. Each chapter will deal with the apparent considerations and pressures which shaped the Canadian policy toward each crisis. Chapter four will attempt to provide an overview of the three crises with specific attention to the impact of the crises on the overall direction of Canadian foreign policy, and the continuity and changes of Canadian policy toward such issues as the refugee problem, navigation rights, and the Israeli territorial borders. Finally, there will be an attempt to analyze Canadian policy toward the Middle East in terms of the total thrust of Canadian foreign policy.

How did the Middle East decisions conform to the broad goals of Canadian policy both explicit and implicit, and the more specific problems of East-West and Commonwealth relations? Hopefully the total study will give us a better insight into Canadian policy-making toward an area of the world which prior to World War II we had little contact with, and was of secondary significance to Canada.

CHAPTER ONE

Any attempt to understand Canadian policy in the Middle East must be prefaced by an understanding of the whole dispute itself. The historical roots of the problem in Palestine stretch back to any point in time after about the year 2,000 B.C. At that time a wandering tribe led by a man called Abraham decided to claim a part of what is modern day Israel. The result was immediate conflict with the Philistines and other tribes which had occupied the area for a thousand years before the Jews arrived. The present day Palestinian Arabs are essentially the descendants of these tribes, though during the period up to the present there has been a considerable mixing of ethnic groups in the area. The Jews lived in Judea until the year 135 A.D., when they were expelled and scattered by the Romans for rebelling against the state. During the next 1800 years the Palestinian residents fell under the rule of the Byzantines, Arabs, Turks, Crusaders, Mongols, and finally the Turks again. In 1918 the Ottoman Empire which controlled Palestine was dismantled by the victorious W.W. I allies and Britain took over Palestine to protect its vital route through Suez.¹

Throughout the period 670 A.D. to 1918 the vast majority of the inhabitants of Palestine were Muslim, but a tiny minority of Jews remained in the area of old Judea. The Turks, with a genius for administration if nothing else,

allowed considerable religious toleration within their empire and the Jews of Palestine lived generally unmolested. By 1918 the Jewish community numbered about 50,000, while there were about one and a half million Palestinians of other religious and ethnic backgrounds, mostly Muslim. After 1887 there was a movement among the Jews in the world to recreate the state of Israel. In 1897 the first world Zionist Congress was held which expressed a desire for a Jewish home in Palestine.

There was considerable sympathy for this idea in Britain and when the British gained control of Palestine they decided to aid the Zionist cause. The now famous, or infamous, Balfour Declaration was issued. Actually it was a letter from the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, stating that the British government looked with favour upon "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."² It was qualified by a statement that this should not in any way prejudice the civic and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities.³

Britain began to allow greater Jewish immigration into Palestine. Unfortunately this occurred at a time of rising nationalism and national awareness among the Arab population of Palestine. The Arabs charged that Britain had reneged on their promise of independence for Palestine

and that they were trying to establish a Jewish state. The combination of nationalism and Jewish immigration led to clashes between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine, which after 1921 became more frequent and bitter, until in 1936 there was a tremendous outbreak of violence. It appears that the British finally became aware that they could not allow unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine and still protect the civil and religious rights of the Arabs as they had promised in the Balfour Declaration. In 1939 the British decided to limit Jewish immigration to 75,000 in the period 1940-1945. After that any further immigrants would have to have the approval of the Arab community. The Zionists attacked this limitation as a breach of faith, while the Arabs adamantly refused to accept another 75,000 Jews into Palestine. World War II interrupted and cooled the situation until after 1945.⁴

The defeat of Hitler's Germany, and the abolition of his concentration camps, left almost a million Jews starved, emaciated, and living in refugee camps after liberation, where most remained until almost 1948. During this period the Zionist movement exerted pressure on the British government to allow these homeless refugees to go to Palestine. The British refused, contending that violence would follow if large-scale immigration of Jews were allowed into Palestine, because this meant the Arabs would become

a minority in their own country. There were other solutions presented but the Zionists were opposed to them. No western country opened its immigration quotas to large scale Jewish immigration. To emphasize their determination to turn Palestine into a Jewish state, terrorists began to attack the British in Palestine adding to the other pressures being exerted to force Britain out of Palestine. Finally in February 1947 the British government, unable to find a solution, decided to turn the problem over to the United Nations.⁵

Prior to World War II Canada had not adopted a position on Palestine. This is quite understandable given Canada's position in the Commonwealth and the fact that Palestine was a British protectorate. There was no real necessity for a Canadian policy position. As late as July 14, 1946, though public interest was growing in the question because of Jewish terrorism in Palestine, Louis St. Laurent reaffirmed this position in the House of Commons when questioned by D.S. Harkness, an opposition member. "There are times and seasons for all things, but I submit this is not the moment [for Canada to take a position on Palestine]" ⁶

The official government policy of non-involvement did not mean there was no interest in Canada in the Palestine question. In fact there was a lively session of

the External Affairs Committee that heard both the Zionist Organization of Canada and the Canadian Palestine Committee on July 19 and July 22, 1946.⁷ These hearings no doubt sparked Mr. Harkness' question in the House of Commons. Representatives of the Canadian-Arab Friendship League, The Arab World, and the Director of the Arab Office in Washington, D.C., applied for and received a hearing on July 26, 1946. Both sides presented their cases clearly and articulately. The Zionists emphasized the sufferings of the Jews and their desire to go to Palestine while the Arabs declared that other countries should accept some responsibility for resettling the homeless Jews of Europe. Since at that time the External Affairs Committee had no power of recommendation it merely referred the minutes of the meetings to the House of Commons.⁸

While not adopting a formal position, Canada was aware of the crisis and had hoped that some type of agreement would come out of the meetings of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine which would aid Britain in solving the Palestine problem.⁹ The committee, with equal numbers of British and American representatives, had been formed in 1947 to bring the Americans, among the most vocal critics of the British Palestine policy, into the decision-making process and gain their support. The Committee was not, however, able to agree on a solution.¹⁰

On April 2, 1947, Great Britain transmitted a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations asking that he request a special session of the General Assembly to constitute a Special Committee on Palestine which would research and prepare a report for the consideration of the regular session of the General Assembly in the Fall.¹¹ By April 13, 1947 a majority of the U.N. members, including Canada, had concurred with the request.¹² In addition to the British request, the governments of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia requested that the agenda also include "the termination of the mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence."¹³ As a member of the United Nations, Canada found herself becoming involved in the problems of the Middle East, and specifically Palestine.

There is little doubt that the Arab proposal was intended to forestall any movement or report which might call for the partition of Palestine, and it was just as apparent that the western nations wanted this option to remain open. When the Arab proposal came before the General Committee it was adamantly opposed by the United States, Great Britain, and to a lesser extent the U.S.S.R.¹⁴ Canada, represented by Lester Pearson, also opposed the Arab proposal. Mr. Pearson said that when Canada agreed to the special session she had two considerations in mind. First she felt that the U.N. might be able to solve the

Palestine problem and second that she supported the British request for a special committee to report to the Fall session of the U.N. He concluded that in his opinion to agree with the Arab proposal would prejudice the issue.¹⁵ The Canadian position was quite clear, (a) no discussion of the substance of the issue at this session which might foreclose some options, partition being one of them, and (b) loyal support for the United States and Britain. The Arab proposal was defeated by the General Committee, 8 to 1, with 5 abstentions. All of the western countries on the committee voted against it.¹⁶

The Arab countries next attempted to have their proposal revived by the plenary session of the General Assembly, but failed by a vote of 24 to 15. Canada again voted against the proposal along with the United States and Britain. With the proposal for a special committee passed, the question was referred to the political committee of the United Nations General Assembly to determine the terms of reference of the new committee. As Canada was chairman of the political committee, Mr. Pearson played a key role in determining the substance of the debates. He took a hard line, allowing debate only on the terms of reference and not on the substance of the issues. The final terms of reference were quite broad, allowing the greatest flexibility possible. Canada was elected as a

member of the United Nations Special Committee On Palestine, or UNSCOP as it is generally known.¹⁷

The complete proposal, including the terms of reference, was then referred back to the General Assembly where it was passed, with Canada voting for the proposal. With that the special session was closed.¹⁸ This special session marks the first time that the Canadian government had been called on to participate in decision-making about Palestine. By siding with the major powers and opposing the Arab proposal, the Canadian government quite definitely showed that it was not in favour of a unitary state of Palestine with a Jewish minority within it. Whether the Canadian position was the result of consultation with the United States and Great Britain is not known, but the similarity of positions would probably indicate some consultation. In any case Canada did not adopt what could be called a unique position.

Between May 26 and August 31, 1947, UNSCOP held numerous public and private meetings both in and out of Palestine.¹⁹ The Arab Higher Committee of Palestine refused to meet with the committee, stating their reasons in a telegram to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

Firstly, United Nations refusal adopt natural course of inserting termination mandate and declaration independence in agenda special session United Nations, and in terms of reference, secondly, failure detach Jewish world refugees from Palestine problem,

thirdly, replacing interests Palestine inhabitants by insertion world religious interests although these are not subject of contention - furthermore Palestine Arabs natural rights are self-evident and cannot continue to be subject to investigation but deserve to be recognized on the basis of principles of the United Nations charter ends.²⁰

There can be little doubt that the failure to present their side damaged the Palestinian cause. The Arab governments recognized this would happen and attempted to convince the Arab Higher Committee to change its stand, but to no avail.²¹ In an attempt to compensate, the governments of Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen appeared before UNSCOP on July 23, 1947 to present the Arab case.²²

The Zionist cause was ably and lengthily explained by Mr. Moshe Shertok, Mr. D. Horowitz, Mr. Ben Gurion, and several other representatives. They argued strongly that all of Palestine should become a Jewish state as soon as immigration brought the Jews into a majority.²³ The only opposition to this stand, other than the Arab governments, was presented by the Communist Party of Palestine, and the representatives of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation, who argued for a bi-national state.²⁴

One of the issues which the committee sharply divided on was the necessity, or advisability, of visiting the refugee camps in Europe. A key Arab argument was that Palestine should not be considered the only alternative in solving the Jewish refugee problem and that by visiting the

refugee camps the Committee would strengthen the connection between what happened in Palestine and the fate of the Jews in Europe. They contended that it was a world problem and that other nations of the world should also accept some responsibility. After lengthy discussion the committee voted six to four for the visit, a victory for the pro-Zionists on the committee, and from August 8 to 14, 1947, a sub-committee visited the camps in Europe.²⁵

In the latter part of August the committee struggled to come up with a recommendation that all could agree on. They were unable to do so. At the forty-seventh meeting of the committee a recorded vote was taken which showed three countries, India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, in favour of a federal state plan. Seven countries voted against this plan, and in favour of the partition of Palestine with economic union.²⁶ This signalled a clear initial victory for the Zionists and those who supported an independent state for the Jews. The committee was able to agree unanimously on eleven other minor recommendations.²⁷

Since the final deliberations of the committee were not recorded it is difficult to assess the role played by Mr. Justice I.C. Rand, Canada's representative on the committee. Mr. St. Laurent had stated in the House of Commons that the government had not instructed Mr. Rand how to perform his duties, which meant that his views

represented his own best judgement.²⁸ A report in The Globe and Mail of September 15, 1947, credited Justice Rand with playing a leading part in drafting the majority report, which if true would place a great deal of responsibility for the partition plan on the Canadian delegation. In any case it appears that Justice Rand was very much in favour of partition.²⁹

Quite predictably the majority report of the committee outraged the Palestinian Arabs who rejected both it and the federal state plan. The Zionist General Council rejected the federal state plan, but favoured the partition scheme.³⁰ The Canadian government made no immediate comments on the report, reserving its stand for the second United Nations session which was to begin on September 16, 1947. Of the major powers the United States had already been on record several times as favouring some type of partition, though at the beginning of the second session there was some doubt as to whether the United States would support the specific terms of the UNSCOP majority proposal. The Soviet Union had come out in favour of partition in May 1947 when it declared that it appeared there was no other solution.³¹ Thus the second session opened with the two major powers in favour of partition.

It was obvious at the beginning of the United Nations session of September 1947, that the Arab states would be

fighting a rear guard action. The majority report favouring partition simply provided too much ammunition for the pro-partition bloc in the General Assembly. The recommendation, however, would require a two-thirds majority to pass and at the beginning of the session the Arabs were confident that though they might not be able to have any of their own proposals adopted they certainly could count on the support of more than one third of the General Assembly to defeat partition. On September 27, 1947, the Arab states lost their first battle when it was decided to constitute a special ad hoc committee to deal with the UNSCOP report instead of the usual method of allowing the Political Committee to debate and report on it. They had argued that by constituting a special committee, the U.N. would be setting aside a special group which might not have the calibre of representatives that would be present on the Political Committee and, that it would be more readily accessible to pressure groups. Beyond this they felt it would lead to a position whereby the issue was treated without regard to other world issues. Canada and other nations supported the proposal for an ad hoc committee on the grounds that this was a special problem requiring a special approach.³²

The Ad Hoc Committee On Palestine began its work on September 25, 1947. The committee first heard the

representatives of the Arab Higher Committee who totally rejected the partition scheme and called into question the legal right of the United Nations to take this action. The Jewish Agency For Palestine was heard on October 2, 1947. They accepted the partition plan with some reservations. Between October 2 and October 22, a general debate ensued, during which the Canadian position was first enunciated.³³

On October 14, 1947, the Canadian delegate, J.L. Ilsley, put Canada in favour of partition. He began by disclaiming that Justice Rand's position necessarily had to become that of the Canadian government. He emphasized that Canada had reached its decision independently. He next compared the Palestine situation of two ethnic groups within a single state to that of Canada but emphasized that there was no agreement in Palestine such as there was between the English and French in Canada.³⁴ He continued:

We maintain the hope, based on our own experience in federation, that they will some day find in a federation a means of solving their problems. For the moment however, we must accept the fact that they [the Arabs and the Jews] have emphatically rejected even the form of federation suggested in the minority report. In the circumstances we have been led to accept, somewhat reluctantly, the majority proposals for partition as a basis for discussion.³⁵

He continued on to stress the importance of some authority and power to implement a decision, since Great Britain would not perform this function.³⁶ On October 21, 1947, it was decided that three sub-committees would be

formed to complete the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. One was to be a committee of conciliation that would attempt to reduce the area of disagreement. A second committee would submit a plan for the governments and territories of a partitioned Palestine. The third was to submit a plan for a unitary state. Canada was included with the United States in the committee for partition.³⁷

Within this committee Canada was most active in trying to establish procedures by which the partition decision could be implemented if force were used, presumably by the Arabs, to thwart the United Nations decision. This led to still another working group composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, Guatemala and Canada, which worked on a plan to try and solve this and other problems. The Canadian role was primarily one of reconciling the views of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., while maintaining contact between the U.K. and the partition committee. It appears Mr. Pearson's efforts were useful in breaking deadlocks which developed over the timing of the British withdrawal.³⁸

The proposals of the second and third sub-committees were brought before the whole Ad Hoc Committee on November 20, 1947. Speaking for the Canadian delegation Lester Pearson praised the work of his sub-committee on partition saying that its plan was "feasible, both theoretically and

practically,"³⁹ while the recommendation of the sub-committee which had worked for a unitary state "had no practical value."⁴⁰ He went on to say that the partition plan would work if the United Nations had the cooperation of the mandatory power (Great Britain), the backing of the Security Council, and acceptance by the people of Palestine.⁴¹ It did not appear to occur to Mr. Pearson that with these three conditions any plan would work. On November 25, 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee adopted the partition plan by a vote of 25-13, with 17 abstentions.⁴²

The scene of the struggle now shifted to the General Assembly where it appeared that the Arab supporters had a better chance of success because of the two-thirds majority rule. By this time most countries had decided on their course of action and did not change. There were some exceptions, the most notable being that of the Phillipines, which changed its position from anti-partition on Wednesday, November 26, to pro-partition on Saturday, November 29.⁴³

The Canadian position remained firm and was again stated by Mr. Ilsley on November 26, 1947. He reviewed the four possibilities for action and rejected all but partition. He denounced the Arab threats of violence and hoped that once a decision was taken the opposing camps would be more reconcilable. He finished by protesting friendship for both Arabs and Jews, and declared that Canada would vote

for partition.⁴⁴ On November 29, 1947, the partition plan passed the General Assembly by a vote of 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions. Of the Asian and African countries only the Phillipines voted for partition. Of the western countries only Greece and Cuba voted against it.⁴⁵

Even with the advantage of hindsight it is rather difficult to believe that the Canadian delegation voted for partition because they thought it was an equitable solution. The original UNSCOP plan sought to give sixty per cent of the land of Palestine to the Jews, who constituted only thirty-three per cent of the population. More importantly, included in that sixty per cent was nearly all of the citrus land, which was fifty per cent Arab owned, eighty per cent of the cereal area, mostly Arab owned, and forty per cent of Arab industry.⁴⁶ The only substantial change in the final partition plan was the creation of an Arab enclave of Jaffa on the coast, a city of mostly Arab residents.

More realistically, the Canadian position was probably the result of two considerations: the domestic political climate and opinion, and Canada's relationship with the United States. This is not to exclude other obvious factors such as Canada's relationship with Great Britain and her concern for the viability of the United Nations; but in this decision they appear to have played a lesser part in the ultimate chain of events.

The domestic political pressures which affected the Canadian policy toward the Palestine problem were the influence of a large Jewish community in Canada, most of which appear to have been solidly pro-Zionist, and to a lesser extent the Canadian government immigration policy. The Canadian government was under heavy domestic pressure from several pro-Zionist sources during the period 1945-1948. The most notable of the organizations were the Zionist Organization of Canada and the Canadian Palestine Committee, both of which appeared before the External Affairs Committee to present the Jewish case for Palestine.⁴⁷ The latter organization was quite unique in that it consisted of non-Jewish supporters of the Jewish position in Palestine. At the time many notable Canadians were members including the future Prime Minister of Canada, John Diefenbaker.⁴⁸

Throughout the western countries the Zionist cause was better and more ably publicized than the Arab view and Canada was no exception. Not only was the press heavily in favour of the Jewish position, but many of the newspapers had staff who had joined the Canadian Palestine Committee.⁴⁹ This tended to create a situation where the government could not help but assume that the public was also in favour of a Jewish state. Politicians or other community leaders who spoke against the creation of a Jewish state ran the risk of being branded anti-Semitic, a charge which

carried no small stigma in a world newly aware of the horrors of Hitler's ovens.⁵⁰

The post-war immigration policy of the Canadian government undoubtedly also played a part in the Canadian position favouring a Jewish state in Palestine. For the Jews in Europe the choice was quite clear. The vast majority of them did not want to return to their former countries because there was little left of their pre-war communities. Most of their relatives and friends had been murdered by the Nazis. The only possible choices were Palestine or the western democracies, most notably North America, where there were large Jewish communities.⁵¹ But Canada and the United States did not open their doors to these people. In Canada no special quotas were set for Jews during the period 1945-1948.⁵² In fact only 5,178 Jews were allowed to enter Canada in the years 1945-1947, while almost a million sat homeless in Europe.⁵³ This was chiefly because Canada restricted immigration to those who had relatives in Canada or could show that they would be self-supporting, and while some Jews qualified under the former category it is doubtful if many could satisfy the second requirement. Only in the spring of 1947 did Canada relax this restriction and allow a quota of ten thousand immigrants who would not qualify under the old regulations but again there was no special consideration for the Jews.⁵⁴

In fairness it should be added that the Canadian record was much better following 1948, but by then it had little effect on the Jewish situation.

There were several reasons why the Canadian government was unwilling to open the door to large-scale immigration immediately after World War II. The major ones were the fear of a post-war depression, the problems of demobilization and assimilation of the returning soldiers into the economy, and the problems of international trade associated with the dollar shortage in the West. Since the Canadian government was unwilling to open its doors to large scale immigration and present itself as an alternative to Palestine for the Jews in Europe, it undoubtedly felt that the best solution was to allow them to go to Palestine. However, in light of the obvious violence that had erupted previously when large numbers of Jews had been allowed into Palestine it would appear now that the Canadian government should have given more thought to other alternatives. Despite official government optimism they surely did not expect that partition could be effected peacefully and they should have seriously considered allowing in more Jewish immigrants. Such a policy seems never to have been considered.

One final note must be made on domestic pressures. Ostensibly the Canadian government went to the General Assembly session of September 1947, uncommitted to any plan.

However, it is again difficult to believe that Canada would vote against a plan of which an eminent Canadian had been the chief architect. To do so would have been almost unthinkable.

The influence of the United States on Canadian policy at this point is less apparent. There is little doubt that the Canadian position pleased the United States but the mere coincidence of voting does not reveal any pressure. However, a statement by Hershel Johnson, the United States representative to the United Nations in 1947, indicates the closeness of the effort:

"The United States delegation is very grateful for Canada's cooperation in this tremendous issue. We worked together like a team. It was a real collaboration."⁵⁵

The creation of the Jewish state was an immensely important issue in the United States. It is not unreasonable to assume that the United States might have exerted some pressure to secure this collaboration, or that Canadian officials were anxious to supply it since it appeared to coincide with domestic opinion and policy.

Canada's efforts to secure a Jewish state were well received within Canada, especially by the Jewish community. As head of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations Lester Pearson received special praise, being dubbed the "Balfour of Canada."⁵⁶

The Arab reaction in the Middle East was violent.

Demonstrations, strikes and raids followed in Palestine where the Arabs refused to accept the fact that their country had been partitioned.⁵⁷ The incidents mounted as the months passed, with both Jews and Arabs engaging in acts of terrorism. The increasing violence led many to the logical conclusion that the Arabs had meant what they said -- they would resist partition by force. The United States was placed in a particularly difficult position. She had to choose between alienating the Arab world, with all the attendant results for the oil industry, or alienating a large part of the domestic polity. Military and diplomatic advisors in the United States were opposed to using American forces to implement partition, and yet by February of 1948 it appeared that this might be the only way partition could be achieved.⁵⁸

The Palestine issue was again brought before the Security Council in late February of 1948 because of the General Assembly recommendations of November 29, 1947, and because of the report of the Palestine Commission, which had been created by the November decision of the General Assembly to assist the transition from British rule to statehood. The report of the Palestine Commission asked for Security Council assistance in discharging its duties because of the increasing violence.⁵⁹ Canada continued to staunchly support the partition plan before the Security

Council on March 3, 1948 and tentatively endorsed the use of force, but only after all peaceful means of implementing partition had been exhausted.⁶⁰

On March 19, 1948, however, the American delegation stunned the members of the United Nations by proposing that partition be temporarily delayed and that the United Nations take over control of Palestine under a trusteeship arrangement.⁶¹ Apparently the military and diplomatic advisors had gained the upper hand in the United States, at least temporarily. The Canadian delegation appears not to have been consulted and was just as astonished as the other nations. Speaking on March 24, General McNaughton cautiously stated that it did not appear that partition could be achieved peacefully. He felt there was merit in the U.S. plan for a cooling off period, but refused to endorse it until other alternatives had been considered.⁶² It certainly appeared that Canadian policy had been thrown into a turmoil by the U.S. reversal. The U.S.S.R. adamantly insisted that the Security Council should reject the United States proposal and proceed with implementing partition.⁶³ At this point the United States proposed a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider the whole situation in Palestine. The proposal passed with Canada's support and Soviet abstention.⁶⁴

Speaking before the First Committee on April 23,

after the special session of the General Assembly had been convened, the Canadian delegate fully endorsed the United States trusteeship proposal, completing the reversal of Canadian policy on partition.⁶⁵ It must have been with great dismay that the Canadian delegation watched the United States reverse its position once again as the May 15 deadline of British withdrawal approached. On May 14, the United States abandoned its trusteeship proposal and gave support to appointing a mediator who would continue to ensure public services after the British withdrew, and would aid in securing some type of peaceful settlement. This resolution was passed on May 14, 1948, with Canada once again supporting the United States initiative.⁶⁶

It was quite evident to all that events outside the United Nations were quickly overtaking the work being done there. On May 14, 1948, the Jews proclaimed the state of Israel and on May 15, full-scale war broke out as the Arab states moved in to aid the Palestinian Arabs. Sixteen minutes after the Jewish state was proclaimed President Truman recognized it, making a shambles of the United States position in the United Nations. The Middle East degenerated into war and chaos.⁶⁷

The policy reversals outlined above are an indication that Canada felt compelled to follow American policy in the United Nations. When the United States decided to abandon

immediate partition because of its world military and political commitments Canada, after some hesitation, followed suit. Certainly the violence in Palestine appeared to preclude a peaceful partition of Palestine, but there were nations in the United Nations, notably the Soviet Union, which were prepared to use force if necessary to effect partition and keep order.

Given the world situation of 1948, with the accelerating cold war between the East and West, it was not politically feasible for the Canadian government to endorse the introduction of force into the Middle East to effect partition if part of that force was to be Communist. It would have put Canada in the position of supporting the Communist bloc countries at a time when most western countries felt threatened by the Communist power. Canadian policy was of necessity tied to the West, and since the United States was the economic and military leader of the West, Canada undoubtedly felt she must support the U.S. initiatives in the spring of 1948. Thus Canadian policy was more heavily influenced by western, and specifically American policy, than by partition considerations. This did not mean that Canada was anti-partition, simply that she had agreed to a delay. However the Jews in Palestine saw the western switch as a concession to the Arabs and feared it might lead to permanent delay.

During the period May 1948 to November 26, 1948, war between Israel and the Arabs first intensified and then decreased after the initial Israeli military success. In the U.N. all efforts were directed toward achieving a lasting armistice that would allow time to formulate some type of peaceful settlement. During November of 1948 a fairly stable cease-fire was arranged. By this time the Israelis had occupied almost all of the proposed Arab state of Palestine. A major policy speech was delivered by Lester Pearson at the United Nations on November 22, 1948 in which he defended the Canadian decision of November 29, 1947:

Our decision last year . . . was taken after considering all other possible solutions which had been proposed for this complicated and terribly difficult problem. We were honestly of the opinion that there was no practicable alternative to partition⁶⁸

He went on to say that there were certain basic facts that had to be accepted. They were: the emergence of an independent Jewish state; lack of an indigenous authority to take over the Arab part of Palestine; agreement that future political and territorial adjustments should be made by the people of the area with the assistance of the United Nations; and finally that the settlement there would have to be peaceful.⁶⁹ He rejected totally the Arab contention that the present situation was the result of injustices that had taken place years before. He said: "They [the Arabs] cannot now expect the United Nations to right ancient

alleged wrongs in the face of recent history."⁷⁰ He also called on Israel to refrain from occupying all of Palestine, declaring that this would be contrary to United Nations declarations. Finally he proposed three things. He called on the United Nations to recognize the existence of a Jewish state, though the boundaries were still fluid, set up a commission to bring about peace in the area, and reaffirm that Jerusalem would be under international control.⁷¹

On December 22, 1948, fighting broke out again between the Arabs and Israelis. Despite this, on December 24, Canada gave de facto recognition to Israel. When the next ceasefire was arranged on January 6, 1949, the Israelis had been almost completely victorious and the Arabs were forced to negotiate a settlement.⁷² On March 3, 1949, the Security Council, with Canada voting in favour, approved the Israelis entry into the United Nations.⁷³

The Canadian position during the period March 1947 - March 1949 was the result of a combination of factors. These were, first, favourable domestic pressure for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine; second, a general accord in this feeling with the other western nations, and especially the United States; and third, a desire to see the United Nations succeed when there appeared to be accord between the West and the Communist bloc on this subject.

It has already been established that there was

domestic pressure in Canada in favour of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Since Canada was not prepared to offer herself, or any other alternatives for the displaced Jews of Europe, and since the Jews themselves had expressed a desire to go to Palestine, the Canadian government undoubtedly felt that a policy in favour of partition was an expedient domestic political solution to the problem.

Added to these domestic pressures was the general feeling throughout the western countries that the Jews should be given their own country. This feeling was strongest in the United States. Thus during the period March, 1947 to March, 1948 it was possible to adopt a policy in favour of partition that was consistent not only with domestic pressures but also with the policies of the other western nations and even the Communist countries. However, when the choice became one between immediate implementation of partition, supported by the Communist countries, or delay of partition, as supported by the United States and other western countries, Canada felt she must follow the other western nations.

Such a conclusion is supported by an examination of world conditions at the time. There was growing disillusionment in the West with the ability of the United Nations to preserve the peace and provide security, coupled with a growing fear of Soviet intentions. Another factor

was the economic slump. Throughout the West there was a dollar shortage and Canada, along with Europe, found herself caught in an economic vise. Their economies were entirely dependent on the United States and under such conditions it would have been unthinkable to oppose the U.S. even if one of the western countries had wished to. For Canada to have maintained a policy on partition different from that of the United States during this period would have been extremely difficult though probably not impossible. However, a general accord in western thinking was reached again after the United States recognized Israel, and Canada was able to once again realign the domestic and external pressures for a Jewish state.

The domestic and international pressures outlined above clearly demonstrate why Canada was in favour of partition and the state of Israel. In all, the position Canada took could be described as an easy one, a position that did not involve the risks of maintaining an unpopular position either domestically or internationally. However, there are good arguments why Canada should have at least attempted to adopt a different position and these will be discussed in the last chapter.

FOOTNOTES

¹Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (Syracuse, New York: University of Syracuse Press, 1968), pp. 1-43.

There are several excellent accounts of this problem. I have found this one to be among the best. For a more pro-Israeli view see Arthur Koestler, Promise and Fulfillment Palestine 1917-1949 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1949), pp. 1-44.

²Koestler, p. 4.

³Khouri, p. 6.

⁴Ibid., pp. 16-27.

⁵Koestler, pp. 101-151.

⁶Canada, House of Commons, Debates, July 16, 1946, Volume IV, p. 3487. (Hereafter cited as Can., H. of C., Debates).

⁷Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 14, July 12, 1946 & July 19, 1946. (Hereafter cited as Canada, H. of C., Stan. Comm. on Ext. Aff., Minutes.)

⁸Ibid., July 22, 1946 & July 26, 1946.

⁹Can., H. of C., Debates, July 16, 1946, Volume IV, p. 3487.

¹⁰Khouri, p. 34.

¹¹United Nations, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Second Session (1947), Official Records, Annex 1, p. 1. (Hereafter cited as U.N., UNSCOP, O.R., annex, and page number).

¹²Ibid., p. 1.

¹³Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1.

¹⁴United Nations, General Assembly, Second Part, First Special Session (1947), Official Records, General Committee, Verbatim Record, Annex 1, pp. 17-49. (Hereafter cited as U.N., G.A., First Special Session (1947), O.R.). The Committee will be cited where necessary.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 25-27.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 81.

¹⁷U.N., G.A., First Special Session (1947), O.R., Main Committees, pp. 1-372.

¹⁸U.N., G.A., First Special Session (1947), O.R., Plenary Session, 79 meeting, p. 177.

¹⁹The complete record of the Committee hearings is available in Supplement no. 11 of the Second Session, vol. 1-5. Included are maps of the partition plans and the travel route of the committee in Palestine.

²⁰U.N., UNSCOP, O.R., Supplement 11, Annex 5, p. 5.

²¹Khoury, pp. 45, 46.

²²U.N., UNSCOP, O.R., Annex B, pp. 32-56. Essentially they simply reiterated the stand that the Arab Higher Committee had taken in its telegram to the Secretary-General.

²³The arguments for the Zionist side are presented verbatim on pp. 1-104 of the Committee report.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 188-192 & 192-206.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 7, 8.

²⁶Ibid., p. 8. The Australian delegate abstained on the grounds that the Committee should not present solutions which even it could not agree on.

²⁷The recommendations of the Committee are too lengthy to append to this paper but the essentials of the eleven recommendations were: 1. Early termination of the

mandate. 2. Independence at the earliest date. 3. The transitional period should be as short as possible. 4. The U.N. should administer the country during the transition. 5. Guarantee of the holy places and access to them. 6. The U.N. should alleviate the Palestine problem. 7. A democratic constitution for Palestine. 8. Peace should be maintained. 9. Economic unity for the country. 10. Special foreign privileges should be abandoned in Palestine. 11. The people of Palestine should cooperate in preserving the peace.

²⁸Can., H. of C., Debates, Vol. IV, June 2, 1947, p. 3708.

²⁹The Globe and Mail, September 17, 1947, p. 6. See also, Robert A. Spencer, Canada in World Affairs 1946-1949 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 143.

³⁰The Globe and Mail, September 1, 1947, p. 1.

³¹Ibid., May 15, 1971, p. 1.

³²U.N., G.A., Second Session (1947), O.R., Plenary Session, 90 meeting pp. 272-275.

³³U.N., G.A., Second Session (1947), O.R., Ad. Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, pp. 5-125.

³⁴This is a rather strange analogy since the agreement of the French in Canada was secured by force of arms.

³⁵U.N., G.A., Second Session (1947), O.R., Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, pp. 84-86.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid., p. 131.

³⁸Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canada at the United Nations, 1947. (Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1948), pp. 189-194.

³⁹United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, p. 178.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Canada at the United Nations, 1947, p. 197.

⁴²U.N., G.A., Second Session (1947), O.R., Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, p. 223.

⁴³The speech by the Phillipines delegate can be found on pp. 1313-1315 of the Plenary Session records.

⁴⁴U.N., G.A., Second Session (1947), O.R., Plenary Session, 124 meeting, pp. 1317-1320.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 1424, 1425.

⁴⁶Khoury, p. 49.

⁴⁷See footnote #7.

⁴⁸Zackariah Kay, "The Canadian Press and Palestine: A Survey 1939-1948," International Journal, Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (Summer, 1963), p. 364.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 361-373.

⁵⁰Can., H. of C., Debates, Vol. VI, July 4, 1947, pp. 5114-5116. Mr. Norman Jacques, M.P. for Wetaskiwin, is an example. Heavy pressure was brought to bear on the Social Credit Party to prevent Mr. Jacques from using the Party paper to present his pro-Arab views. However, in this case it appears that the charges of anti-semitism may have had a solid basis.

⁵¹Koestler, p. 103.

⁵²Can., H. of C., Debates, Vol. III, July 8, 1946, pp. 3211-3212. Prime Minister King did not single out the Jews but made it clear that there would be no special treatment for any group.

⁵³Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Canada Year Book 1948. (Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1949), p. 179.

⁵⁴Can., H. of C., Debates, Vol. VI, July 11, 1947, p. 5446.

⁵⁵The Globe and Mail, December 1, 1947, p. 2.

⁵⁶Spencer, p. 147.

⁵⁷The Globe and Mail, December 1, 2, 3, 1947, p. 1.

⁵⁸Khoury, pp. 60-61.

⁵⁹United Nations, Security Council, 3rd Year, Official Records, 253 meeting (February 24, 1948), pp. 258-264. (Hereafter cited as U.N., S.C., 3rd year, O.R.).

⁶⁰Ibid., 261 meeting (March 3, 1948), pp. 2-4.

⁶¹Ibid., 271 meeting (March 19, 1948), pp. 157-168.

⁶²Ibid., 274 meeting (March 24, 1948), pp. 233-236.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 248, 249.

⁶⁴Ibid., 277 meeting (April 1, 1948), p. 35.

⁶⁵U.N., G.A., Second Special Session (1948), O.R., First Committee, 123 meeting, pp. 70, 71.

⁶⁶Ibid., 141 meeting, p. 274.

⁶⁷Khoury, pp. 63, 64.

⁶⁸U.N., G.A., Third Session (1948), O.R., First Committee, 206 meeting, p. 690.

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 690-691.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 691. This is again a rather curious statement to make in that this is exactly what the United Nations had been doing for the Jews.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 691-692.

⁷²Canada and the United Nations, 1948, p. 77.

⁷³Spencer, p. 151. At this point it is perhaps fair to point out that the Canadian government had not always been unified in favour of Israel. In fact it was Prime Minister King who felt that Canada had been too partial toward a Jewish state, especially in 1947 when he insisted that Justice Rand serve on UNSCOP and not Lester Pearson whom he felt was too heavily influenced by both the Americans and Jewish community. However, by this time St. Laurent and Pearson were substantially in control of external affairs and their views prevailed. See J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The MacKenzie King Record, Vol. 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 121, 157, 158, 177.

CHAPTER TWO

The period 1949-1956 was a time of maturation for Canadian foreign policy. Prior to World War II Canada had opened legations in only six nations, but by the end of 1955 this number had been expanded to forty-seven. This increase in international representation was paralleled by a growth of Canadian participation in international events. The Canadian contribution in the formation of NATO, the Korean war and many other undertakings reflected this increased Canadian activity. However this participation was circumscribed by the realities of the atomic age. Canada was no longer immune to the ravages of war. It was necessary to adjust Canadian policy to that of the other western nations during the period 1948-1956 to counter what was seen in the west as a Soviet Communist threat to their independence. Despite the fact that Canada was definitely aligned with the western bloc she was able to expand her contacts with the developing countries also. The area Canada was latest in establishing diplomatic relations with was the Middle East, perhaps somewhat odd since Canada gave considerable attention to this area during the 1947-48 crisis.⁷⁴

In fact, after assisting vigourously in the birth of the state of Israel as a "midwife's helper,"⁷⁵ Canadian participation in the Middle East was generally limited to support of the United Nations relief efforts for the

Palestine refugees. Though her financial contributions were not always outstanding, Canada at least maintained consistent political support for the aid of the Palestinians.⁷⁶

Domestically most Canadians apparently remained sympathetic to the Israeli viewpoint and Canadian politicians were quick to praise the accomplishments of Israel when invited to Canadian Jewish functions.⁷⁷

Despite this domestic favouritism, the official Canadian policy in the Middle East was one of equal treatment for both sides. As an example, Canada opened legations in both Israel and Egypt in the same year, 1954. In a speech to the House of Commons on January 24, 1956, Lester Pearson, then still Secretary of State for External Affairs, reiterated that it was not Canadian policy to allow unrestricted arms supplies to the Middle East. Canada restricted sales to a size that would not upset the balance in the area. He went on to state that the government had rejected the recent request of Egypt for fighter aircraft, but had allowed a shipment of Harvard training aircraft to be sent. He finished by saying that the value of arms shipments to the Middle East had totalled about two million dollars in 1955, of which \$1,332,100 went to Israel, while \$770,825 went to Egypt.⁷⁸

During the early part of 1956 the opposition Conservative Party was determined to embarrass the government

over its policy in the Middle East. When the government announced the sale of Harvard training aircraft to Egypt, the Conservatives voiced opposition to the sale of any type of equipment for any mid-East country, presumably including Israel. However, when Israel applied to the Canadian government for permission to buy jet fighters the Conservatives switched positions and supported the sale to Israel. Their fluctuations appeared to amount to a course of political expediency.⁷⁹ For the government, the Israeli request presented a major problem and they delayed their reply through the spring and summer of 1956. Prime Minister St. Laurent elaborated on the problem in the House of Commons. He declared that no other western nations were prepared to send sophisticated military equipment to Israel and that Canada would not go ahead alone.⁸⁰ The logical extension of the earlier government stand on Egypt must have also prevented them from quick approval of the Israeli request. To have granted it so soon after rejecting a similar Egyptian request would have been difficult to explain to the Egyptian government. However, events in the Middle East were again to overtake the policies of the western nations and force some radical changes.

Along with other western countries Canadian policy toward the Middle East had been somewhat uncertain, primarily because of the rapid changes that had occurred during

the previous three years. In 1952 a military coup in Egypt had overthrown the monarchy and a young colonel named Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged during the next months as the new strongman in the country. One of the major issues on which he had staked the reputation of his regime was the construction of a huge dam on the Nile river at Aswan to provide both irrigation for agriculture and electrical energy for industry in Egypt. Negotiations with the western countries for loans to proceed with this dam had been carried out in 1955, and in early 1956 it appeared that an agreement had been reached with the United States and Britain. The World Bank had also agreed to finance the project along with the western countries.⁸¹

On July 19, 1956, the American government suddenly withdrew its offer of aid for the dam. The following day the British and the World Bank followed suit. These incredible developments seemed to have been sparked by the desire of John Foster Dulles, American Secretary of State at that time, to strike back at Nasser for accepting arms shipments from the U.S.S.R., recognizing the People's Republic of China, and other "neutralist" tendencies.⁸² Whatever the reasons for the action, and the coldly insulting manner in which it was carried out, Nasser was infuriated. He struck back by nationalizing the Suez Canal Co.⁸³

The legal implications of the action by Nasser have

never been completely sorted out but it appears that the Egyptian government proceeded correctly under international law, even to the extent of agreeing to international arbitration in the matter of compensation.⁸⁴ Britain and France, however, were more concerned with what they considered to be the strategic implications of the action. They felt control of the canal by Egypt, instead of an international body, threatened their vital lifeline of supply from the oilfields of the Middle East. In addition the Eden government was at that time under heavy domestic fire for being too timid in world affairs. It also appears that Prime Minister Eden was convinced that Nasser should be equated with Hitler and that the situation was much like Munich in 1939. Accordingly, both Britain and France rejected the nationalization and threats of force began to pervade the international atmosphere.

In an attempt to ease the situation the United States arranged for an international conference of canal users in early August.⁸⁵ The conference recommended that an international authority be set up to run the canal, but Egypt rejected this solution. In September the United States proposed another canal users' association but Egypt rejected this one also. Apparently Dulles had foreseen that the latter plan would probably not be any more acceptable than the first one but he had proposed it in attempt to keep

Britain and France from taking any military action, a course which the United States opposed.⁸⁶

In fact the governments of France and Britain had already determined to use force if the Egyptian government did not accede to their conditions. This was apparently decided in August but several conditions delayed them, not the least of which was the inability of the British to put together a substantial force. Since the French did not have any forward bases close to Egypt they were unable to proceed alone. Both countries had also hoped they would be able to overcome the American reluctance to join them and delayed any use of force until this possibility appeared hopeless. However, in waiting so long they lost one of their key reasons for intervention. They had long contended that the Egyptians would be unable to keep the canal open if the foreign pilots who guided the ships through the canal were withdrawn. On September 15, 1956, they were withdrawn, but the Egyptians were able to keep the canal running smoothly. After this, direct intervention on the pretext that the canal could not be kept open by the Egyptian government was impossible. Something else was needed.⁸⁷

The new pretext was provided by Israel. In late September, France approached Israel about the purchase of arms and the possible coordination of an attack on Egypt.

The Israelis, not unaware of the French troubles with the Arabs in Algeria and the Egyptian support for the rebellion there, were sympathetic.⁸⁸

The Israeli interest in a preventative war with Egypt was based on other considerations also. From the Gaza Strip, Palestinians were able to launch raids into Israel in hope of forcing the Israelis to return their lost farms and businesses. The Israelis blamed the Egyptians for not controlling the Palestinians and retaliated with raids into Egyptian territory. The Israeli raids were calculated to inflict much more damage than they themselves had sustained in order to force the Palestinians to stop. However, the opposite effect was achieved, which led to a spiraling military situation. The Israelis were also becoming increasingly nervous about the Egyptian military capability after the shipments of arms from the Soviet Union in 1955. With the prospect of French and British aid a preventative war appeared to be a good solution.⁸⁹ The latter part of 1956 appeared most opportune as Egypt became increasingly embroiled with Britain and France and withdrew much of her army west to protect the canal against a possible Anglo-French attack.⁹⁰

In September, the Israelis and the French reached an agreement to cooperate against Egypt and huge quantities of arms were transferred to Israel from France during late

September and early October. During this period the British were approached about collaboration with the Israelis. Britain was reluctant to publicly engage in any type of venture with Israel because of her strong connections with Jordan and Iraq. However, in early October the British finally secretly agreed to use force in conjunction with Israel. It only remained to finalize the planning.⁹¹

Meanwhile frantic public efforts were being made to settle the whole problem peacefully. From October 9 to 14, discussions took place in the Security Council at the United Nations in an attempt to find a solution. Britain and France continued to insist on internationalization of the Canal, but the U.S.S.R. lined up solidly on the side of the Egyptians and vetoed a plan in the Security Council on October 14, 1956.⁹² The decision was again thrust back to the British and French, and they decided to go ahead with the use of force. Israel would attack Egypt and provide the British and French with an excuse to intervene to keep the Suez Canal open. When the total military operation was complete Israel would control the Sinai, while Britain and France would control the Canal and perhaps more. On October 29, 1956, the Israeli army invaded Egypt.⁹³

During the period August 1956 to the invasion on October 29, the Canadian role in the crisis appeared to be minimal. When questioned in the House of Commons about

Canada's reaction to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, External Affairs Minister Pearson replied only that Canada was consulting with other governments, but had no intention at that time of making a representation to the Egyptian government.⁹⁴ On July 30, 1956, Prime Minister St. Laurent restated this position.⁹⁵ However, the next day in the House, Mr. Pearson talked about the "arbitrary seizure" of the Suez Canal and left little doubt about whom Canada sympathized with.⁹⁶ From this point until October 29 official Canadian participation was limited. She was not invited to the London Conference in August, and publicly maintained that it was primarily an European problem.⁹⁷

Despite the official image of calm and detachment, the Canadian government was worried. During August, Mr. Pearson wrote to Norman Robertson, Canadian High Commissioner to Britain, expressing concern that Britain and France might use force to settle the dispute. He felt that this would not only disrupt the Atlantic alliance but place severe strain on the Commonwealth because the Asian members would not support a move of this type. He felt they were certain to see it as a revival of British imperialism.⁹⁸

In response Mr. Robertson called on Lord Home, British Secretary for Commonwealth Affairs, to inform him that if Britain used force in the Middle East Canada would not support them.⁹⁹ At this point it appears that Canada

was extremely concerned that a split might occur between the Atlantic allies.

Though opposed to the use of force Canada strongly supported international control of the Canal, and hoped that Britain and France could achieve this goal in the United Nations where Mr. Pearson felt he was most effective. As already pointed out, when the case was placed before the Security Council little was accomplished despite Canadian support.

Twelve hours after the Israeli invasion began on October 29, 1956, Britain and France issued an ultimatum, as previously planned, which called on both Israel and Egypt to pull back from the Suez Canal or face intervention. The United States immediately announced they were opposed to any Anglo-French intervention. It appeared that Canada might be forced into a position where she would have to choose between Britain and the United States, a choice almost impossible for any Canadian government to make in 1956. The Canadian Cabinet met on the morning of November 1, in an attempt to find some solutions to the problem. The tentative plan agreed on was to try and have the Anglo-French forces converted into a United Nations force. But when he arrived in New York that afternoon, Mr. Pearson found that the Anglo-French ultimatum had stirred up tremendous outrage and indignation and he quickly decided

to shelve the plan that the Cabinet had agreed on earlier.¹⁰⁰

Later that afternoon the General Assembly met for the first time under the Uniting For Peace Resolution, a procedural device designed to bypass the veto power in the Security Council. The United States took the lead in demanding a ceasefire. After a lengthy speech Mr. John F. Dulles tabled a resolution which clearly showed the irritation of the U.S. government. He called the Anglo-French-Israeli actions "a grave error, inconsistent with the principles and purpose of the charter"¹⁰¹ The resolution called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces behind the 1949 armistice lines.¹⁰² This clear condemnation of the invasion and ultimatum left the United States seriously split with Britain and France.

Discussion on the U.S. resolution was cut short by a Pakistani motion to limit debate to three speakers for each side, and Canada was unable to speak before the vote on the ceasefire resolution. Mr. Pearson had an opportunity to speak privately with Mr. Dulles prior to the session but could not get the American to delay or alter his resolution.¹⁰³ Thus the Canadian delegation was faced with the clear dilemma of a choice between Britain and the United States on the very first day. The resolution was put to a vote and passed 64 to 5, with six abstentions. Canada, searching for a way out, abstained. Australia and New Zealand

were the only countries to vote with France, Britain, and Israel against the resolution.¹⁰⁴

Mr. Pearson was the first speaker to rise afterwards and explain his vote. He declared that Canada had abstained because she felt that with a little delay a more unanimous resolution might have been worked out. He deplored the suggestion that the situation should revert to the status quo which had been so disastrous.¹⁰⁵ He went on to say:

I therefore would like to have seen a provision in this resolution . . . authorizing the Secretary-General to begin to make arrangements with member governments for a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out. I regret exceedingly that time has not been given to follow up this idea, My own government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international peace and police force.¹⁰⁶

In a following speech, Mr. Dulles of the United States supported the Canadian initiative. He called on Mr. Pearson to formulate a plan to implement his suggestion.¹⁰⁷ When Mr. Pearson left the United Nations building he received a call from Norman Robertson in London who told him that the British government was apparently willing to consider the type of force that was being proposed.¹⁰⁸

The Canadian abstention at the United Nations on the initial vote for the ceasefire has been described by some as a "brilliant tactical stroke,"¹⁰⁹ but the reasons given for abstaining are not completely convincing. The

official government reason that the American resolution did not go far enough must be regarded with some scepticism. If the Canadian delegation wanted a resolution that went further they could simply have voted for the American resolution and then introduced the further resolution that created UNEF. In fact a vote for the American resolution would have banished any doubts that the Afro-Asian members may have felt about Canada's relationship with Britain. As it was, the abstention did create some doubts and many Afro-Asian members saw it as an equivocal move.¹¹⁰

However, to have voted for the American resolution would have been perceived by the British, and a good many Canadians, as a vote of condemnation. This was a course that no Canadian government could have taken. But given the Canadian stand on the use of force, and the American stand on the invasion, it would appear that the Canadian government could not have sided with the British and French either. The plain fact is that there was no other choice the Canadian delegation could have made, and to describe it as a brilliant tactical stroke is in this case an exaggeration, if not incorrect.

On November 3, 1956, the Canadian delegation introduced a resolution which read as follows:

As a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it [the General Assembly] within forty-eight hours, a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency

international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the terms of the aforementioned resolution.¹¹¹

This resolution was incorporated into an Indian resolution which once again called for a ceasefire and withdrawal. The U.S. delegate, Mr. Lodge, immediately rose and spoke in support of the Canadian initiative, urging that it be given immediate priority.¹¹²

During the previous one day interval the Canadian delegation had been lobbying intensively for its plan. Initially Secretary-General Hammerskjold had been sceptical but finally agreed to try the idea. The U.S. reaction had been much the same. Finally, in exchange for the votes of the 19 non-aligned nations which were supporting the renewed Indian call for a ceasefire, Canada agreed to vote for that motion, though it is not known how much value the Indians placed on the Canadian vote.¹¹³

The Canadian portion of the total resolution was passed 57 to 0, with 19 abstentions. The Indian portion passed 59 to 5, with 12 abstentions. Britain, France, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand again voted against the ceasefire portion, while this time Canada voted with the majority.¹¹⁴ The Canadian delegation had been successful in the first stage of its effort to create the United Nations Emergency Force. As Mr. Pearson stated later in the House of Commons in November: "Of course there was

nothing new in either this idea [UNEF] or its proposal . . . except in the sense that it was adopted, but in no other respect."¹¹⁵ Mr. Pearson could rightly feel that at that time a breakthrough had been made and Britain and France had been given the opportunity to withdraw gracefully.

The Secretary-General had been given forty-eight hours to present a plan, but working together with Pearson they presented a plan on November 4, just twelve hours later. The plan immediately established a U.N. command headed by Major-General E.L.M. Burns, the then Chief of Staff for the United Nations Truce Organization in the Middle East. This was adopted by another vote of 57 to 0, with 19 abstentions.¹¹⁶ The battle appeared to have been won. It only remained for the British and French to telegram their acceptance of the plan. Pearson was stunned to hear less than an hour later that an Anglo-French paratroop invasion of Egypt had begun.¹¹⁷

It is not entirely clear what caused the British and French to proceed with their invasion after a U.N. force, which they agreed would stabilize the area and achieve their ends, had been formed. In his memoirs Prime Minister Eden gave this reason. "It was clear to me that a postponement could not be accepted Postponement would, in fact, have meant calling off the operation"¹¹⁸ It appears that the "operation" had gathered a momentum that

could not be stopped at that point.

After the invasion had begun, pressures outside the United Nations for a ceasefire became intense. On the same day, November 5, the Soviet Union sent messages to Britain and France that they lay under the threat of nuclear destruction if they continued their present course of action.¹¹⁹ Tense reports of Soviet planes overflying Turkey were relayed. Added to these concerns was the fact that the Anglo-French governments could not get confirmation from Washington of American aid in the event that the Soviet Union attacked the Anglo-French forces in the Middle East.¹²⁰

Added to the military woes was the economic dislocation which the intervention had caused. The crisis provoked a run on sterling which the British government could not stem because the United States was blocking a loan from the International Monetary Fund. This in turn increased the pressure on the pound. There was also the constant questioning of the opposition Labour Party in the House of Commons. Under all of this pressure the resolve of the British government crumbled and Prime Minister Eden telephoned Premier Mollet of France, on November 6, that Britain would have to accept the ceasefire. The French were bitterly opposed to this but realized that they could not continue without the British.

Thus, on November 7, 1956, the Anglo-French expeditionary force stalled, still twenty miles short of control of the Suez Canal.¹²¹

The Anglo-French acceptance of the ceasefire allowed the United Nations efforts to once again proceed. On November 7, 1956, Resolution A/3308 was passed, implementing the earlier decision to create a United Nations force and also establishing an advisory committee.¹²² The Canadian efforts had paid off. All that remained was the technical implementation of the plan.

The withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces proceeded through the next three months, albeit reluctantly. At one time it appeared that Israel would not accept the idea of total withdrawal, arguing that she must retain the Gaza Strip and Sharm al-Sheikh to maintain her security. The majority of the nations in the United Nations were of the opinion that Israel should not gain anything from the war and demanded her complete withdrawal. Although Canada stood firm behind the U.N. withdrawal resolution she attempted to link a political settlement to it. In a speech to the General Assembly Mr. Pearson agreed that Israel should not be allowed to dictate the terms of withdrawal but he also supported the right of Israel to a "secure existence."¹²³ Finally Israel agreed to withdraw totally if the United Nations would patrol the Gaza Strip

and Sharm al-Sheikh. In fact this constituted a gain for her in that she was able to send her ships through the Gulf of Aquaba for the first time. The crisis was over and Canada had played a significant role in determining the shape of events in the Middle East.¹²⁴

Any attempt at analysis of Canada's role in the 1956 crisis is immediately confronted with the necessity of assessing and reconciling the several conflicting pressures on Canada at the time.

How did the government reconcile a policy of general support for Israel with opposition to the attack on Egypt? What weight was placed on the American attitude in contrast to the traditional ties with Britain? What impact did support for the general British objectives have on the fact that Canada did not support the means employed? What part did domestic pressures play? Finally, how important was the western split perceived by Canada? All of the above confused the situation for Canada.

Out of this chaos of conflicting aims the Canadian government apparently decided to consider the last point of western unity the most important issue and they attempted to follow a policy that would in some way at least partially pacify or take account of the other interests involved.

Essentially what Canada attempted to do, and succeeded, was to fulfill the role of an honest broker, someone who

could mediate the differences between the western countries and yet maximize western interests in the Middle East while minimizing losses. The split among the western allies occurred not because of a difference over the goal - that of wresting control of the Suez Canal from Nasser - but over the means. The United States opposed the use of force and the inevitable outcome had to be that the United States position would prevail. The power realities of 1956 dictated that solution. What Canada did was to make this transition as easy as possible. Uppermost in Canada's mind then was not whether the solution was the best one for the Middle East - though it obviously had to be at least minimally acceptable - but what type of solution would best heal the split in the west.

The fact that a split would occur and the consequences of it if Britain and France defied the United States and used force against Egypt were predicted quite specifically by Mr. Pearson in his letter to Mr. Robertson on August 6, 1956, just before the conference of Maritime nations:

I assume that the British position is based on the hope that an agreement for international control of the canal can be reached at this conference I find it difficult to share the hope that Egypt will accept such an agreement If political pressure fails, then the British and French seem committed to the use of force for which they might have little legal justification The use of force would probably extend beyond the Suez area into Egypt itself, the consequences would be

far-reaching for the Commonwealth, [and] for Anglo-American cooperation It is clear that every possible effort must be made to prevent a chain of developments which would result in Anglo-French military force being exerted against Egypt in a way which (would) split the Commonwealth, weaken the Anglo-American alliance, and have general consequences which would benefit nobody but Moscow.¹²⁵

Perhaps the key words are in the last sentence where Mr. Pearson is opposed to the use of force "in a way" which would weaken the western alliance and the Commonwealth. The clear implication of this statement is that he did not oppose the use of force if it could be applied in some legal way.

This interpretation is buttressed by the later statement of Mr. Pearson in the House of Commons again implicitly supporting the use of force against Egypt under different circumstances. Speaking of the Israeli invasion he said:

I admit -- and I am sure all members of this House must admit -- the provocation which may have prompted this move. We in the government tried to understand that provocation; nevertheless we did at that time, and do now, regret that the attack was made at that time and under those circumstances.¹²⁶

Again the clear implication is that another time and set of circumstances might have been acceptable. Such an interpretation is not unrealistic when one considers how deeply committed Canada was to the British position of internationalizing the Suez Canal. Mr. Pearson expressed this quite well in the same speech quoted above.

I do not for one minute criticize the motives of the Government of the United Kingdom and France in intervening in Egypt at this time. I may have thought their intervention was not wise but I do not criticize their purposes.¹²⁷

One author has commented on Pearson's speech in this manner:

When one considers that a major goal of the British and French governments was to topple Nasser and to clear the way for a more moderate (or less anti-western) leader in Egypt, Pearson's comments reveal a degree of bias which was not consistent with Canada's stated objectives of promoting peace in the area.¹²⁸

When one sees the Canadian role not as primarily that of a peacemaker but as a broker, or mediator for the west, the inconsistency noted above becomes clear. The original Canadian Cabinet plan of November 1, 1956, to try and have the Anglo-French forces converted into United Nations forces could be interpreted as a final attempt to aid the British and French in achieving internationalization of the Canal.

When it became clear that this was impossible, the Canadian role changed from one of achieving goals to minimizing losses. The losses that Canada sought to prevent are best explained by Mr. Pearson:

And then Mr. Speaker, we were also anxious to do everything we could down there to prevent any formal condemnation of the United Kingdom and France as aggressors under the charter . . . and also to do what we could to help repair the lines of communication and contact between Washington, London, and Paris¹²⁹

The Canadian initiative was quite successful in this

respect. The British and French were allowed to withdraw gracefully without condemnation, and communication between the three capitals was reestablished. Of lesser importance, but still significant, was the symbolic value of Canada's vote for the Indian ceasefire resolution. It proved to the non-white Commonwealth members that the old members would not necessarily line up against the new ones. In this respect the Canadian government also performed a vital service for the Commonwealth.

The motivation for Canadian actions can thus be found in her relationships with her allies in the west. This should not be surprising given the relatively minor position that the Middle East occupied in Canadian foreign policy. In 1956 the most important consideration for the Canadian government was the continued stability of the western alliance to counter what was perceived as a continuing Soviet threat. Any weakening of that alliance would obviously be considered a weakening of Canada, especially given the events transpiring in Hungary at the same time.

Beyond this there must have been the simple recognition that if a permanent split occurred between the United States and Western Europe, Canada would be forced by geographical proximity to the side of the United States. Disruption of Canada's extra-North American contacts would have to result in a diminution of Canadian influence,

and to a degree independence. Canadian interests simply demanded that Canada do everything possible to repair the breach between Washington and Europe.

Unfortunately this policy which served Canadian interests so well eventually turned out to be a disaster for the Middle East. Two major criticisms of the United Nations force support this judgement. First, and most important, the U.N. force effectively froze the status quo in the Middle East and actually prevented negotiations from taking place. As long as Israel was free from the attacks of the Fedayeen on the Egyptian border, with the territorial advantages of the 1948 war intact, and free passage through the Gulf of Aquaba, there was no necessity for her to negotiate. The same type of situation was true for Egypt. The United Nations force made it impossible for Israel to mount the type of attack on Egypt which had just been so successful. There was little motivation for Egypt to go to the bargaining table and find a permanent solution.

It can be argued that this analysis has the advantage of hindsight and was not so obvious to the decision makers at the time. It is difficult, however, to believe that a statesman acute enough to have deduced the results of the Anglo-French invasion three months before it happened, could not perceive the rigidity which the U.N. force would build

into the Middle East. The criticism is not that Mr. Pearson did not recognize that a political solution was needed - he stressed this in almost all of his speeches - but that he did not sponsor nor appear to pressure for a resolution which would have set up the machinery necessary to start negotiations. It was surely obvious that without this type of initiative negotiations would probably not begin, and without them UNEF would not be successful since it was not intended to separate two armies by physical force, but only to control smaller incursions which might build to larger confrontations. The obvious course was to withhold the installation of UNEF unless there were accompanying negotiations. But if the primary task of UNEF was to provide a face-saving device for British and French withdrawal then it was necessary to install it irrespective of whether there were accompanying negotiations or not. Though the two motivations may not have been clearly distinguished in the minds of Canadian negotiators at the time, it is reasonable to speculate that they wanted UNEF installed primarily to heal the western split and hoped that negotiations would start later.

In the final analysis Canadian policy during the 1956 crisis can once again be termed pragmatic in the sense that it was perceived that certain Canadian interests appeared to be involved and were pursued by the government.

The solutions presented by Canada appeared to have reached the objective of healing the split in the west, but despite the hopes of 1956 they eventually proved useless in promoting a lasting peace in the Middle East. Once again pragmatic policies contained the seeds of future trouble in much the same fashion as 1948.

FOOTNOTES

⁷⁴James Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs 1955-57 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 1-23.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 243.

⁷⁶Canada, Department of External Affairs, Report of the Department of External Affairs, 1952 (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1953), p. 14.

⁷⁷Bernard Figler, "History of the Zionist Ideal in Canada," Canadian Jewish Reference Book and Directory, published by the Jewish Institute of Higher Research, Central Rabbinical Seminary of Canada, 1963, p. 93.

⁷⁸Can. H. of C., Debates, January 24, 1956, Volume 1, p. 466.

⁷⁹Ibid., March 16, 1956, Volume III, p. 2203.

⁸⁰Ibid., July 11, 1956, Volume VI, pp. 5860-61.

⁸¹Terence Robertson, Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1964), p. 16.

⁸²J. Bowyer Bell, The Long War: Israel and the Arabs Since 1946 (Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 283 and 284. Perhaps the most important reason for cutting off aid on the Aswan Dam was the southern cotton lobby in the United States. Egypt was perceived as a major competitor for this market and there was considerable pressure against aiding the Egyptians to export their cotton production.

⁸³Michael Adams, Suez and After: Year of Crisis (Boston: Beacon Hill, 1958), p. 4.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Bell, p. 292.

⁸⁶Robertson, pp. 120-126.

⁸⁷Ibid., pp. 115-122.

⁸⁸Bell, pp. 294, 295.

⁸⁹Lt. General E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co. Ltd., 1962), pp. 148-185.

⁹⁰Khoury, pp. 212, 213.

⁹¹Robertson, p. 140.

⁹²U.N., S.C., 11th year, O.R., 743 meeting (October 13, 1956), p. 18.

⁹³Robertson, pp. 164-166.

⁹⁴Can., H. of C., Debates, Vol. VII, July 28, 1956, pp. 6608, 6609.

⁹⁵Ibid., July 30, 1956, p. 6655.

⁹⁶Ibid., July 31, 1956, p. 6787.

⁹⁷Eayrs, p. 254.

⁹⁸Robertson, pp. 83, 84.

⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 88-92.

¹⁰⁰William R. Frye, A United Nations Peace Force (New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1957), pp. 1-3.

¹⁰¹U.N., G.A., First Emergency Special Session (1956), O.R., Plenary Session, pp. 10, 11.

¹⁰²Ibid., pp. 11, 12.

¹⁰³Robertson, p. 189.

¹⁰⁴U.N., G.A., First Emergency Special Session (1956), O.R., Plenary Session, pp. 34, 35.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., pp. 35, 36.

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 39.

¹⁰⁸Robertson, p. 194.

¹⁰⁹Maxwell Cohen, "The United Nations Emergency Force: A Preliminary View," International Journal, Vol. XII, No. 2, Spring, 1957, p. 110.

¹¹⁰Alastair Taylor, David Cox, and J.L. Granatstein, Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response (Toronto: John Deyell Ltd., 1968), p. 129.

¹¹¹U.N., G.A., First Emergency Special Session (1956), O.R., Plenary Session, p. 55.

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Eayrs, pp. 258-261.

¹¹⁴U.N., G.A., First Emergency Special Session (1956), O.R., Plenary Session, p. 71.

¹¹⁵Can., H. of C., Debates, Vol. 1, November 27, 1956, p. 71.

¹¹⁶U.N., G.A., First Emergency Special Session (1956), O.R., Plenary Session, p. 89.

¹¹⁷Robertson, p. 239.

¹¹⁸Sir Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden, K.G., P.C., M.C., Full Circle (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1960), p. 551.

¹¹⁹Eayrs, p. 264.

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Robertson, pp. 261-276.

¹²²U.N., G.A., First Emergency Special Session (1956),
O.R., Plenary Session, p. 126.

¹²³Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements
and Speeches 57/9. (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1956).
(Hereafter cited as Can., S. & S., 57/9.)

¹²⁴Ibid.

¹²⁵Robertson, pp. 83-85.

¹²⁶Can., H. of C., Debates, Vol. 1, November 27, 1956,
p. 4.

¹²⁷Eayrs, p. 185.

¹²⁸Donald Ellis Milsten, "Canadian Peacekeeping: A
Meaningful Role for a Middle Power," (unpublished Master's
Thesis, Department of History, University of Michigan, 1968),
p. 128.

¹²⁹Can., H. of C., Debates, Vol. 1, November 27, 1956,
p. 6.

CHAPTER THREE

The major role which Canada had played during the Middle East crisis of 1956 was not to be repeated during May and June of 1967. The differences in the world political climate, Canada's relative world position, and other factors all contributed to the inability of Canada to make the impact she had in 1956. The change is aptly described by Robert Reford:

The major part Canada had played in the Suez Crisis of 1956 had created an illusion. In the eyes of the public, it marked the emergence of Canada as a power to be reckoned with, and they expected their government to be able to continue this role. In fact it marked the peak of Canadian influence One strong role inevitably breeds expectations of a repeat performance, especially when it brings with it the award of an Oscar, in this case the Nobel Peace Prize. What was not evident at the time was as one commentator put it, that this was 'a one night stand, an exceptional time staged amid circumstances unlikely to reoccur.'¹³⁰

But if Canada did not play a starring role, she certainly did participate and contribute to the United Nations efforts to secure another settlement of the fifty-year-old dispute in the Middle East.

The ultimate causes of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 are not found solely in the events of that year. As pointed out several times through this study, the roots can be traced back almost two thousand years. However, there are some specific events which occur after 1956 that can be identified as the preconditions of the fighting which broke out in 1967. Chief among these was the inability of the

United Nations, the major powers, or the countries of the Middle East, to find a political solution to the problem of Israel. Canada had constantly urged that such a settlement must take place, but like the other nations of the world she was content to talk and did not introduce any specific resolutions to facilitate such a settlement.¹³¹ Realistically, there was probably little Canada could have done, but at least it would have been comforting to be able to note that there were some solid Canadian attempts to secure a political settlement. As already noted at the end of chapter two, the introduction of UNEF also removed any incentive which might have led either Israel or Egypt to make concessions leading to a lasting peace.

More important was the fact that UNEF was not stationed on the borders between Israel and Syria, or Israel and Jordan. While the Palestinian guerrillas were unable to operate from Egypt, they could strike into Israel from Syria and Jordan, apparently with or without the permission of those countries. From the point of view of the Israelis the guerrillas were an illegal terrorist group which must be controlled by Israel if Syria and Jordan could, or would not. From the Palestinian Arabs' point of view they were a partisan group trying to liberate their homeland in much the same fashion as the French partisans of World War II.¹³²

This viewpoint of the Palestinians certainly did not endear them to the Israelis. They were not prepared to allow Palestinian Arabs to make raids on Israeli villages, and struck back at the countries which were host to the guerrillas. The problem with this approach was that the Israelis did not always kill just guerrillas, but innocent Arab villagers also. As the Palestinian attacks increased in 1966, Israeli retaliation also increased. On November 3, 1966, Israel made a massive retaliatory strike into the Jordanian village of al-Samu, killing many villagers and leveling a large part of the village.¹³³ The increasing raids and counter-raids finally led to a serious clash between Israel and Syria on April 7, 1967. Syria contended that Israel had sent in an armed tractor to cultivate the demilitarized zone, which was forbidden by the 1949 armistice. Israel replied that it was an unarmed tractor and that it had a perfect right to be there. In any case, heavy fighting took place between the two countries, including an air battle outside Damascus, the Syrian capital.¹³⁴

This action, along with the earlier Israeli raids, apparently led to the feeling among the Arabs that Israel was preparing to strike a major blow at Syria. Intelligence reports from Syria and Lebanon, corroborated by the Soviet Union, convinced the Syrians that an attack was imminent. There is now some doubt as to the authenticity of these

reports, but at the time they were believed. On May 8, 1967 the Syrians communicated their concern to President Nasser of the U.A.R. and asked for confirmation of Egyptian aid if Israel attacked. Apparently the Syrians were dubious that Egypt could help with the United Nations force in the way. Other Arab countries had let it be known that they also felt the U.A.R. was hiding behind UNEF and that if she was to honor her defense pact with Syria she must be able to strike back when Israel attacked. She could not do this if the United Nations force was in the way.¹³⁵

There has been considerable speculation about other reasons which may have prompted President Nasser to ask for removal of UNEF. The Israelis contend that it was to attack their country, though subsequent events do not appear to substantiate this view. A more likely explanation is that President Nasser saw an opportunity to recover some of his personal prestige, which had been slipping during the period 1957-1967. One author commented:

Thus, to deter an attack on Syria, to save his declining prestige and influence in the Arab world, to quell the charges that he was lacking courage to face Israel, and to prove his dependability to his fellow Arabs, Nasser felt he was left with no choice but to take a 'calculated risk'¹³⁶

The calculated risk was to ask UNEF to leave, and move Egyptian troops up to the Israeli border to demonstrate the fact that Egypt was in a position to counterattack if Israel invaded either Syria or Jordan. On May 16, 1967,

General Fawzy, Chief of Staff for the United Arab Republic, sent a message to General Rikhye, the Commander of UNEF, that they would have to withdraw UNEF from certain positions in the Sinai.¹³⁷ The events leading to war were once more in process.

General Rikhye quite rightly refused to accept the order of General Fawzy, pointing out that he could only take orders from the United Nations. Secretary-General U Thant communicated this to the government of the U.A.R. through its representative at the United Nations on the evening of May 16. He also took a firm stand that there could be no partial or temporary withdrawals. He maintained that the force must stay intact or leave altogether.¹³⁸ At noon of May 18, the Secretary-General received the following communication:

The government of the United Arab Republic has the honour to inform Your Excellency that it has decided to terminate the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force in the territory of the United Arab Republic and the Gaza Strip.¹³⁹

Later in the afternoon the Secretary-General summoned a meeting of the UNEF Advisory Committee including the three non-Committee nations contributing troops to UNEF. He explained the situation and informed them that he had decided to withdraw the force.¹⁴⁰

It is at this point that Canada's involvement in the 1967 crisis was at its peak. At the Advisory Committee

meeting Canada objected strongly to the idea that the U.N. force should withdraw because the U.A.R. requested it. Speaking in the House of Commons on May 18, External Affairs Secretary of State Paul Martin implied that U Thant was acting too hastily in the matter of the withdrawal and should call the question to the General Assembly.¹⁴¹ On the same day The Globe and Mail reported that a "highly placed person said the U.N. force would not budge."¹⁴² The attitude of Canada was thus quite clear from the start. First, the Canadian government questioned the right of the U.A.R. to ask UNEF to leave, and second, she questioned both the hastiness and right of U Thant to make the decision without calling for General Assembly approval.

The Canadian government was to beat a hasty retreat on its criticism of U Thant's handling of the situation. On May 23, Opposition Leader John Diefenbaker attacked the government for its criticism of U Thant. He defended him by pointing out the many accomplishments of the Secretary-General.¹⁴³ External Affairs Minister Martin hastily rose and praised the Secretary-General, assuring the House that he had not intended to criticize U Thant personally. The following day in the House of Commons Prime Minister Pearson also added: ". . . I am not being critical of the Secretary-General because I have no doubt that, on examination of the documents, one would come to the conclusion

that what he did was right in terms of the documentary evidence."¹⁴⁴ In fact the right of the U.A.R. to order UNEF out of the country is a hotly disputed point. William V. O'Brien concludes that the U.N. had a good case for keeping UNEF in the U.A.R.,¹⁴⁵ while Yashpul Tandon, writing in International Organization, concludes that the U.A.R. had the right to order UNEF out.¹⁴⁶

Although the Canadian government clarified the fact that it was not criticizing U Thant specifically, it did not retreat from the stand that the U.A.R. could not unilaterally ask the U.N. force to leave. This view appears to have been based on two considerations; the personal recollections of Prime Minister Pearson about the nature of the agreement between the U.N. and the U.A.R., and the fact that it would be a serious blow to the idea of U.N. peacekeeping if the host country could order the force out at any time.

The personal recollections of Prime Minister Pearson are most interesting, especially when reviewed from the major speeches in which he referred to UNEF's status. In a speech to the General Assembly on November 23, 1956, Mr. Pearson appeared to contradict himself when he said at one point: "Also as we understand it, the force is to remain in the area until its task is completed, and that would surely be for the determination of the United Nations

itself."¹⁴⁷ Yet also in the same speech he says:

I agree of course, that the force . . . could not operate in the territory of a country without the consent of that country. That is why we are happy that Egypt has given that consent in principle and I am sure that we all agree that . . . no infringement of sovereignty is intended.¹⁴⁸

In fact, the Canadian interpretation of the conditions by which UNEF entered Egypt were never formally agreed to. In his speech of May 24, 1967, Mr. Pearson told the House of Commons:

There was a special arrangement made between Mr. Hammarskjold and President Nasser. I objected to that arrangement at the time because I thought it might cause a lot of trouble in the future. At that time we did not follow the preferable course because we had to get these people over there quickly . . . and if, by this agreement, very fuzzy in its language, . . . the U.A.R. would accept this force, we thought we had better not go into legalistic details too closely but get our troops on the spot.¹⁴⁹

The fact that the Canadian point of view in the paragraph above was never put into writing at the time is probably an indication that an official policy of this type was not acceptable to Egypt. The U.N. policy in 1956 of saying one thing, writing another, and meaning still another, bore fruit in the confused situation of 1967. One must agree with The Globe and Mail when it said that during the early stages of the 1967 crisis Mr. Martin and Mr. Pearson were on "thin constitutional ground."¹⁵⁰

In any case, as a matter of practicality, pointed out by U Thant, the force was unable to continue. It was

not designed to force its will on a country, but to keep two countries apart. In his report to the General Assembly the Secretary-General pointed out that it was his responsibility, "to avoid any action which would either compromise or endanger the contingents which make up the force."¹⁵¹ Also, India and Yugoslavia refused to keep their contingents in the U.A.R. without that country's permission. While it can be argued that U Thant might have been able to delay the withdrawal, it appears that the force would have ultimately had to leave in any case. What the Secretary-General did was to protect the lives of the UNEF force. It is strange that Canada appeared to be so adamant on the removal of UNEF. Apparently the Canadian government felt that the prestige and effectiveness of peacekeeping would be damaged, perhaps fatally, if the U.A.R. succeeded. In any case it should have been obvious to Canadian diplomats that without the agreement of the host country, and more crucially the member nations of UNEF, it was impractical for the force to stay.

When it became obvious that UNEF was going to be withdrawn, Canada switched its tactics and tried to retain a U.N. presence in the Middle East by two other methods. First, Mr. Martin tried to get Israel to accept UNEF on its side of the border, but consistent with its stand of 1957 Israel refused this request.¹⁵² The second avenue

was to join with Denmark in calling for a special session of the Security Council. On May 23, 1967, Mr. Martin announced that they had been successful and that the Security Council would meet the next day.¹⁵³ The very same day of this announcement President Nasser decided to re-blockade the Gulf of Aquaba.

Up to May 23, 1967, it appeared that Canada might once again play a major role in the crisis in the Middle East, but after President Nasser's action of May 23, the major powers split on their approach to the problem and its consequences. Egypt and Israel had been in the role of client states of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. respectively, and the importance of the crisis left little room for middle power maneuverability.

The closure of the Gulf of Aquaba to Israeli shipping appears to have been the final step in Nasser's "calculated risk." Prior to 1956 Israeli shipping had been prohibited in the Gulf because Israel and Egypt were still technically at war. After the UNEF contingent took over at Sharm al-Sheikh in 1956 Israeli ships were allowed to pass through. Apparently President Nasser sought to re-establish the situation as it was prior to 1956. He based this move on the facts that historically the Arab states had controlled the Gulf, that it was within Arab territorial waters at the entrance, and that Israel had acquired Elath, its port

on the Gulf, by force after the armistice of 1948 had been signed.¹⁵⁴

The Israelis argued that the closure was an act of war and would be treated as such. They pointed out that from 1958 on the major maritime powers had publicly committed themselves to freedom of navigation through the Gulf and that the Egyptian closure was contrary to International Law. They stated that Israel would take such measures as were necessary to alleviate the problem, as provided for by the right of self-defense in Article 51 of the United Nations charter.¹⁵⁵ Once again the legal right of the U.A.R. to close the Gulf of Aquaba to Israeli shipping is a point of dispute. William V. O'Brien argues forcefully that the U.A.R. did not have the legal right to do this, but also admits that such a well known scholar as Robert Fisher of the Harvard Law School disagrees, feeling that a better case can be made for the Egyptian position.¹⁵⁶ It is possible that the legal dispute might have been solved had the Israelis replied to the Egyptian initiative that the question be decided by the World Court, but Israel was apparently not willing to follow this course, and in any case practical considerations on both sides were more important at the time.¹⁵⁷

The Security Council took up the issue for the first time on May 24, 1967. Canada and Denmark were immediately

subjected to attacks by the Soviet Union for "dramatization of the situation,"¹⁵⁸ in calling for a meeting of the Security Council. At this point it appears that the Soviet Union did not wish to disturb the gains that the Arab nations were making by having the Security Council interfere. The Canadian delegate, Mr. Ignatieff, replied that Canada felt the reports of the Secretary-General, and the closure of the Gulf of Aquaba were serious enough events that the Security Council should be summoned to look at the situation.¹⁵⁹ Mr. Federenko, the Russian delegate, countered that the Security Council should have waited until Mr. Thant, then in Cairo for talks with the Egyptians, returned with a full report. The Bulgarian delegate wondered why, if the situation was so intense, the Secretary-General himself had not requested a meeting.¹⁶⁰ The United States supported the Canadian initiative by pointing out, "This Council meeting cannot dramatize a situation which at this moment is at the centre of the stage of the world."¹⁶¹ The Canadian-Danish call received rough treatment and the tenor of the Soviet comments was quite that of a major power telling a minor power that it has overstepped its role in the world.

The U.A.R. also had harsh words for Canada:

It is regrettable that the governments of Canada and Denmark saw fit to act on behalf of both the United States and the United Kingdom. It is indeed

ironic that the two countries I have mentioned - Canada and Denmark - which have championed the submission of this question to the Security Council in the name of peace and security, have acted adversely in failing to support the role of the United Nations in South-West Africa.¹⁶²

Apparently stunned, the Canadian delegate, Mr. Ignatieff, could only reply that he found it difficult to see anything in what Canada had done that would justify the "intemperate reply" of Mr. El Kony, the Egyptian delegate.¹⁶³ Shortly thereafter the nations agreed to adjourn the meeting with the intention of consulting informally among themselves. The vigorous Canadian efforts to keep UNEF in Egypt, despite the wishes of the U.A.R., had borne bitter fruit in Canadian-Arab relations.

At the same time, Prime Minister Pearson had been making a speech in the House of Commons regarding the situation in the Middle East. He declared that the central issue was the right of Israel to live in peace and security, a right rejected by the Arabs. He also stated that future peacekeeping forces should have a firmer foundation so that, "their work cannot be sabotaged except on order from the United Nations agency which sent them there."¹⁶⁴ He also took the stand that the Gulf of Aquaba was an international water.¹⁶⁵ His use of the word "sabotaged," when referring to the work of the United Nations force, was most unfortunate in that the Egyptians hardly thought they had

sabotaged the force, and probably felt that whatever impartiality Canada had shown was now lost. This speech was followed by a joint statement from Pearson and President Johnson of the United States two days later, after the President had visited Ottawa. In it they indicated their agreement on the issue of freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aquaba.¹⁶⁶

To the Arab governments all of these actions, including a visit to Canada by the President of Israel in May, constituted evidence that Canada supported Israel. Whatever perception of Canadian impartiality there may have been was lost. In fact, Canadian actions up to May 23, 1967, had not been strictly impartial. Her outspoken opposition to the removal of UNEF stood in sharp contrast to the stand taken by India and Yugoslavia that the U.A.R. had a perfect right to order UNEF out. Canadian insistence that Israel should be able to use the Gulf of Aquaba and the Suez Canal was diametrically opposed to the Arab view. Only after May 23, 1967, did Canada admit that perhaps there should be a legal decision made on the issue by the World Court. Finally, Mr. Pearson's statement that the central issue was Israel's right to live in peace and security completely ignored the central issue as seen by the Arab countries. They felt the central issue was the right of the Palestinians to return to their homes, or

at the very least be adequately compensated by Israel. While Mr. Pearson did call for a solution to the refugee problem he certainly never mentioned it as the central issue and did not speak at all of any Israeli obligation to compensate the Palestinians. On each issue the Canadian position closely approximated that of Israel and opposed that of the Arabs. These Canadian stands could well have been conceived of by the government as the correct ones, but they certainly could not be termed impartial.

From May 24 until June 5, 1967, frantic efforts were made to find some solution to the problem. Both the Arab countries and Israel mobilized and for days the Middle East sat on the edge of war. The length of time between the mobilization and the actual beginning of the war lulled many people, including the governments of the Arab countries, into a false sense of security, a belief that fighting might not come. But on June 5, 1967, full scale war broke out for the third time in nineteen years.

The United Nations was immediately informed of the outbreak and the Security Council summoned. Both Israel and Egypt charged each other with starting the war,¹⁶⁷ though later accounts have fairly well established the fact that Israel struck first. Informal discussions took place outside the Security Council and the next day, June 6, an immediate ceasefire resolution was passed

unanimously.¹⁶⁸ This resolution appears to have been a compromise finally accepted by the U.S.S.R. because the military situation of the Arabs had become hopeless. The Soviet Union had wanted a ceasefire resolution which also called for a withdrawal, much the same as the one presented by the United States in 1956, but this time the United States, and apparently Canada, opposed this type of resolution.¹⁶⁹ Prime Minister Pearson had outlined the Canadian position the day before when he said that there should be no attempt to assess blame, but simply to get a ceasefire to stop the bloodshed.¹⁷⁰ Both Mr. Pearson in the House of Commons, and Mr. Ignatieff at the U.N., underlined the fact that the ceasefire was just a first step.¹⁷¹

It is interesting to make a comparison between the Canadian actions on the ceasefire resolution of 1967 with 1956, especially since Mr. Pearson was involved in both decisions. In 1956 Canada abstained on the U.S. resolution which called for both a ceasefire and withdrawal on the grounds that it did not go far enough, that more was needed to ensure peace in the Middle East. Yet in 1967, when the Soviet Union presented a resolution almost identical with the type presented by the U.S. in 1956, Canada opposed it not because it did not go far enough, but because it went too far. While simple ceasefire was considered inadequate in 1956, it was considered ideal in 1967.

This inconsistency is not explained by the different situations. In fact, in 1967 there were only Israeli troops occupying Arab territory which should have made it easier to pass a withdrawal resolution since there were no British and French troops to withdraw. The only explanation must be that Canada, consistent with other western countries, felt the perhaps Israel should occupy the Arab territory until a political settlement was effected. No doubt the position of the U.S. influenced Canadian decision-makers in that it appeared hopeless to pass a withdrawal resolution that did not meet with U.S. approval, and certainly the Soviet resolution did not. But the inconsistency on the principle of Israeli withdrawal between 1956 and 1967 is the interesting point.

In the Security Council the Arabs bitterly opposed a resolution which they felt left Israel with the fruits of her aggression.¹⁷² The wrangle between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. was to deadlock the Council until after the war was over.

On June 8, 1967, Prime Minister Pearson made a major policy speech to the House of Commons which outlined the Canadian position for peace in the Middle East.

1. Certain military withdrawals, after a ceasefire with political guarantees, which would produce stability.
2. Freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aquaba.

3. Freedom of passage through the Suez Canal for Israel.
4. A U.N. force on both sides between the combatants.
5. A demilitarized zone between Israel and the Arab states.
6. A settlement of the refugee situation.¹⁷³

It would not be too great an exaggeration to say that with the exception of points four and six these proposals could have been used by an Israeli negotiating team. Point one specifically recognizes that Israel is to be allowed to keep some of the territory she has conquered, and also asks the Arabs to give up their only trump card, recognition of Israel, before the negotiations take place about return of their land. Points two, three, and five provide rights and safeguards for Israel, which she had been trying to secure since 1949, when she was denied them by Arab action. Admittedly these points could also be viewed as an internationalist position, if one supports the legal stand of Israel, but this does not change the fact that they include some prime objectives of Israel. Point six deals with the refugees but nowhere in his speech does Mr. Pearson say the Israelis have any responsibility for the refugee problem or its solution, though he does admit there may not be a political solution if something is not done about the refugees.¹⁷⁴

In the Security Council, Canada continued to support

the call for an unconditional ceasefire. On June 8, the Soviet Union had introduced a resolution condemning Israeli aggression. On June 10, Mr. Ignatieff said that reports out of the Middle East were most "confusing," and indicated that there was little basis for such a condemnation. Instead he called for a strengthening of UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, and co-ordinated relief for the new refugees of the war.¹⁷⁵ On June 13, the Canadian delegate to the Security Council said once more that there was little useful purpose in a vote on the Soviet resolution.¹⁷⁶ The next day the resolution failed by a vote of six in favour with nine abstentions, a two thirds majority being required for passage. All of the western nations abstained, while all of the Communist and non-aligned nations voted for the resolution.¹⁷⁷

With its defeat in the Security Council the Soviet Union moved its efforts to the emergency session of the General Assembly called on June 14. It was during this session, which was essentially a continuation of the Security Council debate, that Canada modified the position taken by Prime Minister Pearson on June 8. In his first major address to the U.N. General Assembly during the emergency session, Mr. Martin stated Canada's position and the important items that must be settled:

First, respect for the territorial integrity of the nations of the area, including provision for

the security and international supervision of frontiers.

Secondly, the right of all nations to innocent passage through international waterways must be assured.

Thirdly, there must be an early and just solution of the refugee problem.

Fourthly, international concern for the preservation of special spiritual and religious interests in Jerusalem¹⁷⁸

He called a just solution to the refugee problem "a vital step forward in the achievement of peace and stability in the Middle East."¹⁷⁹ However, he also said: "It would be an illusion to go on believing that the problem of [the Palestinian] refugees will simply be solved on the basis of their return to Israel."¹⁸⁰ Finally, Mr. Martin tried to rebuild Canada's position of neutrality on the issue by saying:

We have no substantial interests to further. We have no claim to make other than those which arise from a deep and legitimate concern for peace and justice in the Middle East, indeed in the world¹⁸¹

These terms represented a fairly substantial change from the position of Prime Minister Pearson. Where Mr. Pearson talked about "certain military withdrawals," Mr. Martin talked about respect for the territorial integrity of all nations, which could be interpreted as total withdrawal of the Israeli forces. Mr. Pearson flatly stated that Israel must have passage through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aquaba, while Mr. Martin talked

about freedom of passage through international waters, indicating perhaps that if a legal decision showed the Gulf of Aquaba not to an international waterway Israel could not expect innocent passage. The same argument would also apply to the Suez Canal. In any case, Mr. Martin leaves room for negotiation. Finally Mr. Martin called for an "early and just solution" to the refugee problem, while Mr. Pearson had only called for a solution. However, Mr. Martin also stated the position that the Palestinians could not all return home, that this solution was an illusion, and they should in effect realize the practicalities of their situation. Again he left the door open for negotiations about how many Palestinians could return, but he also avoided any reference to the fact that Israel might have a responsibility for the compensation of the Palestinians. In total, the Martin speech clearly showed a more flexible Canadian stand which called for a much more negotiated settlement than had Prime Minister Pearson. What caused this shift in position is unknown, but by this time it was becoming accepted that Israel had struck first in the war, and it is possible that the Canadian government was having second thoughts about its strong support for the Israeli claims.

During the emergency session, which lasted through the summer, the U.S.S.R. continued to lead the fight for

the Arabs, while the U.S. tried to blunt any efforts that Israel found objectionable. Two resolutions which called for Israeli withdrawal were tabled, the first sponsored by Yugoslavia and seventeen other neutral nations, the second by the Latin American countries. The former was denounced by Israel as favouring the Arabs, and the latter by the Arabs as favouring the Israelis. The result was that neither resolution gained the necessary two-thirds majority, which delighted the Israelis.¹⁸²

The efforts once more shifted back to the Security Council where a compromise solution was sought. During all of this time the Egyptians and the Israelis fought sporadic battles along the Suez Canal, which kept the pressure on the United Nations to find a settlement. Canada continued to support the view that any Israeli withdrawal should be linked with "other basic issues involved."¹⁸³

On November 22, 1967, the Security Council finally unanimously adopted a resolution which called for an Israeli withdrawal and the end of belligerency in the Middle East.¹⁸⁴ In explaining Canada's vote Mr. Ignatieff said:

We think that this resolution . . . has the best prospect of opening the way to the result which I believe we all desire, namely, a state of just and lasting peace in the Middle East.¹⁸⁵

He went on to say that he thought it appeared to be as balanced a resolution as possible.¹⁸⁶

This Security Council Resolution has never been implemented because Israel has never withdrawn. Canada, along with a majority of other countries, has reiterated its support for the November 22 resolution each year in the General Assembly, but the Middle East still sits on dead centre.

Canadian policy toward the crisis of 1967 can be broken into two stages, each apparently with a separate motivation. Stage one lasted from May 17 to approximately May 24, 1967. During this period the Canadian government followed a policy of open disagreement on the decision to withdraw UNEF, coupled with a public effort aimed at the continuation of some U.N. presence in the Middle East if UNEF was withdrawn.

During this stage it appears that the Canadian government was pursuing a rather independent policy. It was doubtless motivated by the close Canadian association with UNEF, especially in the person of Prime Minister Pearson, and a desire to see it continue its function despite the wishes of the government of the U.A.R. The merits of pursuing this policy have already been discussed. It should have been apparent to the Canadian government that as a matter of practicality and safety the force had to be withdrawn when the U.A.R. asked it to leave, especially when the Indian and Yugoslavian contingents

said they would not stay. If the Canadian maneuvers were meant as a delaying tactic they were also poorly thought out. With the Egyptian and Israeli armies facing each other, a UNEF force caught between could have been severely mauled. An indication of what could have happened was demonstrated when several Indian soldiers were killed by the Israelis while withdrawing from the Sinai area, just after the war had started on June 5, 1967.

On more solid ground was the Canadian attempt to revive the U.N. Truce Organization. Israel had refused to deal with UNTSO since the 1956 war, but had the Canadians been successful in reviving it the war might have been averted. In general, the Canadian reaction during stage one was hasty and ill-conceived, especially considering it forced the Canadian government into a position where it appeared that they were criticizing U Thant personally.

When it became apparent to Canadian officials, probably around May 24, that there was a decisive split between the United States and Russia, and that Canada's earlier initiatives had cost her the image of impartiality, the Canadian government apparently decided to follow the United States initiative along with other western nations, France being the exception. Essentially this amounted to tacit support of Israel, though publicly Canada still maintained that she was completely impartial on the issue.

Perhaps the most salient issue of 1967 from the Canadian point of view is the relegation of Canada to a minor role during the crisis of 1967, after having played a major role in 1956. One author analyzes it this way:

One of the major reasons Canada was able to play such a decisive role in the crisis of 1956 arose from its detachment and impartiality When Nasser nationalized the Canal, Pearson had condemned his violation of an international convention. However in the ensuing crisis Canada had retained an air of comparative detachment. It had not taken sides In 1967 these conditions did not apply. Canada was on record from the first crisis as supporting Israel's right to use the Gulf of Aquaba Canada had a proprietary interest in UNEF and deplored Nasser's demand that it leave his country In fact, the government had not taken sides and it was sympathetic as ever to the rights of the Arabs not to live in fear of aggression by Israel. But the record of impartiality had been destroyed when seen through Arab eyes. Thus Canada's ability to play a creative role in the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967 was virtually nonexistent.¹⁸⁷

At first glance this might appear to be an acceptable analysis of the problem, but it does not bear up well under close scrutiny. In fact, Canada was not as impartial in 1956 as the author would have us believe. Canada consistently supported the aims of Britain and France for internationalization of the Canal and the Israeli right to live within the borders of 1956, rather than the original partition of 1947. Nor did the Arabs see Canada as being truly impartial. Egypt's reluctance to accept Canadian troops in the UNEF force in 1957 was not solely due to the similarity of the Canadian and British uniforms. The Egyptians saw Canada's

abstention on the first vote for a ceasefire in 1956 as evidence of equivocation on the Canadian part. They were still afraid that Canada supported Britain.¹⁸⁸ The U.A.R. government was much more blunt in the 1967 crisis. Nasser called Canada's role contradictory, neo-colonialistic and aggressive. Speaking in Cairo he said: "We must deeply condemn the attitude of Canada as an act of total hostility."¹⁸⁹ It would be safe to say that the Arabs did not perceive Canada as being impartial in either crisis.

A more plausible hypothesis rests on two arguments. First, Canada was able to play a significant role in 1956 because the western nations needed someone to fill the role of broker for, and mediator within, the western alliance. Second, there was the fact that the two superpowers agreed on the need for withdrawal. The split between the western powers in 1956 necessitated the emergence of a broker and mediator who could successfully extricate the western nations from their disaster in the Middle East. Canada accomplished this task with a minimum of loss for the west. In 1967 the western nations were in perfect agreement, though France took a harder line toward Israel, and there was no function for Canada to fill. Added to this was the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States were opposed to each other, both supporting their respective client state. This left the chances of successful creative action

at a minimum. In 1956 the United States and the Soviet Union had also been in agreement on the need for withdrawal and ceasefire. It would appear that these and not her supposed impartiality were the salient reasons why Canada could not play the same role in 1967 as she did in 1956.

The Canadian role of 1967 more closely approximated that of 1948 than of 1956. In both 1948 and 1967 the large western powers took a pro-Israeli position which apparently fitted well with the domestic feeling in Canada and the Canadian government simply followed the course of least resistance. Of major importance in 1967 was the fact that the Canadian government publicly admitted that it no longer thought practical the decision of the 1949 General Assembly that the Palestinians should have the right to return to their homes and land. This may appear to be only acknowledging the obvious but it is a substantial victory for Israel in her fight to prevent any Palestinians from returning. The 1967 decisions also appear to have marked a new low for Canada in the Arab Middle East. It has certainly destroyed what credibility may have existed in the Arab mind, with the result that Canada has been classified as just another western nation supporting an expansionist Israel. This is extremely unfortunate in that it could well be that Canada might have played a more constructive role in the Middle East had she been willing to follow a more impartial

course in 1967. As it stands, Canada is being judged harshly by the Arabs while being unable to affect Israeli policy, even though she has given Israel critical support, a distinctly unenviable position.

FOOTNOTES

¹³⁰Robert W. Reford, Canada and Three Crises (Lindsay, Ontario: John Deyell Ltd., 1968), pp. 136, 137.

¹³¹Throughout the major speeches of Mr. Pearson to the U.N. and the House of Commons during and after the 1956 crisis there are many references made to the necessity of a political settlement but no specific proposals presented.

¹³²Hisham Sharabi, Palestine and Israel (New York: Western Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 106, 107.

¹³³Winston Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East (New York: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1969), pp. 175, 176.

¹³⁴Ibid., p. 177.

¹³⁵Henry Catton, Palestine, The Arabs and Israel (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1969), p. 100.

¹³⁶Khoury, p. 245.

¹³⁷U.N., G.A., Fifth Emergency Special Session (1967), O.R. Plenary Session, 1525 meeting, p. 5 (See General Report to the General Assembly A6730).

¹³⁸Ibid., p. 6.

¹³⁹Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁴⁰Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁴¹Can., H. of C., Debates, Vol. I, May 18, 1967, p. 381.

¹⁴²The Globe and Mail, May 18, 1967, p. 1.

¹⁴³Can., H. of C., Debates, Vol. I, May 23, 1967, pp. 471, 472.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., May 24, 1967, p. 535.

¹⁴⁵William V. O'Brien, "International Law and the Outbreak of War in the Middle East," Orbis, XI, No. 3 (Fall, 1967), pp. 706-712.

¹⁴⁶Yashpul Tandon, "UNEF, The Secretary-General and International Diplomacy in the Third Arab-Israeli War," International Organization, XXII, No. 2 (Spring, 1968), pp. 529-556.

¹⁴⁷Can., S. & S., 56/33.

¹⁴⁸Ibid.

¹⁴⁹Canada, Department of External Affairs, Monthly Bulletin (Ottawa: Queens Printer, May, 1967), pp. 256, 257.

¹⁵⁰The Globe and Mail, May 19, 1967, p. 6.

¹⁵¹U.N., G.A., Fifth Emergency Special Session (1967), O.R., Plenary Session, 1525 meeting, p. 2 (A/6730).

¹⁵²Can., H. of C., Debates, Vol. I, May 23, 1967, p. 510.

¹⁵³Ibid.

¹⁵⁴U.N., S.C., 22 Year, O.R., 1343 meeting (May 29, 1967), p. 7.

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

¹⁵⁶O'Brien, Orbis, XI, No. 3, p. 709.

¹⁵⁷Khoury, p. 263.

¹⁵⁸U.N., S.C., 22 Year, O.R., 1341 meeting (May 24, 1967), p. 2.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁶¹Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁶²Ibid., 1343 meeting (May 24, 1967), p. 5.

¹⁶³Ibid., pp. 7, 8.

¹⁶⁴Can., H. of C., Debates, Vol. I, May 24, 1967,
p. 531.

¹⁶⁵Ibid.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., May 26, 1967, p. 602.

¹⁶⁷U.N., S.C., 22 Year, O.R., 1342 meeting, June 5,
1967, pp. 3-5.

¹⁶⁸Ibid., 1348 meeting, June 6, 1967, pp. 1-2.

¹⁶⁹Burdett, pp. 328, 329.

¹⁷⁰Can., H. of C., Debates, Vol. I, June 5, 1967,
p. 1348.

¹⁷¹U.N., S.C., 22 Year, O.R., 1348 meeting, June 6,
1967, p. 7.

¹⁷²Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁷³Can., Department of Ext. Affairs, Monthly Bulletin,
June, 1967, pp. 300, 301.

¹⁷⁴Ibid.

¹⁷⁵U.N., S.C., 22 Year, O.R., 1355 meeting, June 10,
1967, pp. 10, 11.

¹⁷⁶Ibid., 1359 meeting, June 13, 1967, pp. 4, 5.

¹⁷⁷Ibid., 1360 meeting, June 14, 1967, pp. 18, 19.

¹⁷⁸U.N., G.A., Fifth Emergency Special Session (1967),
O.R., Plenary Session, 1533 meeting, pp. 9-12.

¹⁷⁹Ibid.

¹⁸⁰Ibid.

¹⁸¹Ibid.

¹⁸²Khouri, pp. 268-271.

¹⁸³Can., S. & S., 67/30.

¹⁸⁴U.N., S.C., 22 Year, O.R., 1382 meeting, November
22, 1967, p. 10.

¹⁸⁵Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁸⁶Ibid.

¹⁸⁷Reford, pp. 137, 138.

¹⁸⁸Alastair Taylor, David Cox, and J.L. Granatstein,
Peacekeeping, International Challenge and Canadian Response
(Lindsay, Ontario: John Deyell Ltd., 1968), p. 129.

¹⁸⁹John Saywell, Canadian Annual Review (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 224.

CHAPTER FOUR

Canadian participation in the three Middle East crises can best be assessed by breaking the analysis into three broad sections. The first section will deal with the specifics of the involvement, examining the continuity of Canadian policy toward those basic problems which have plagued the Middle East during all three crises. At the same time it will assess these policies in terms of their impartiality, indicating where one or the other side has apparently been favoured. Section two will then take these positions on the specific issues and determine how well they reflected the stated goals and directions of Canadian foreign policy, taking into consideration both external and internal pressures. Finally, section three will look at the impact on Canadian foreign policy resulting from our Middle East involvement, specifically examining the concept of peacekeeping. The analysis of these broad areas should provide us with a substantial appraisal of Canada's role in the Middle East.

In each of the three Mid-east crises there have been certain constant problems which have remained unsolved. The lack of a solution for these problems has again in turn generated new problems and conflicts in later years. Posed in question form they appear like this: Should Israel exist? If so, how much, and what territory should it occupy? What navigation rights should Israel have,

specifically in the Gulf of Aquaba and the Suez Canal? Finally, and most importantly what is to become of the Palestinian refugees waiting in their wretched camps? The answers to these questions during the period since 1948 quite accurately frame Canadian policy over all three crises.

On the question of Israel's existence the positions of those involved are very clear-cut. The Arabs flatly deny that Israel should exist, contending that the United Nations had no right to partition Palestine, especially without a plebiscite. The Israelis maintain that the United Nations decision was a simple recognition of a natural right, the right of the Jews to return to their own country. The Canadian position in favour of the existence of Israel was declared at the United Nations in November, 1947, when Canada voted for the partition of Palestine.¹⁹⁰ Since that time Canada has continually reiterated this stand, most emphatically in 1956¹⁹¹ and 1967.¹⁹² In rejecting the Arab arguments Canada has demonstrated her support for Israel on the primary issue in the Middle East.

The logical question which proceeds from Israel's existence is what territory it should occupy. On this issue Canadian policy is less clear. During the period November 1947 to November 1948 Canada supported the position that Israel should remain within the portion of Palestine which the United Nations had designated for her. In his

speech of November 1948, Mr. Pearson added his warning to others that Israel should not occupy all of Palestine.¹⁹³ However, once Israel had actually occupied all of Palestine, Canada apparently decided to treat it as a fait accompli and appears to have regarded the 1949 ceasefire line as the official border.¹⁹⁴ During the 1956 and 1967 crises Canada eventually supported the United Nations call for complete withdrawal, but quite openly sympathized with the Israeli position that they must maintain their position at least in Sharm al-Sheik and the Gaza strip. This attitude was quite evident in the Pearson speeches in early 1957¹⁹⁵ and again in June of 1967,¹⁹⁶ indicating that perhaps Canada might still favour some further territorial adjustments if she were involved in a peace settlement.

Quite naturally the sympathy for the existence of Israel has generated a sympathy for a militarily secure Israel. Yet Canada apparently does not want to be in the position of condoning the use of force to achieve this end. The Canadian policy since 1949 appears to have been to recognize Israeli control of what formerly was Palestine as a matter of practical reality, and to support certain other border adjustments which would make Israel more secure, if these adjustments can be worked out by negotiation. Presumably this could include some portions of the

other Arab countries if they were ceded at the bargaining table. In any case, Canada is apparently not looking for the restoration of any smaller Arab state of Palestine in the area that Israel now occupies.

The Canadian attitude on Israeli navigation rights has been quite consistent with the other western nations. The Arabs insist that Israel should be denied the right to use the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aquaba - the former because a state of war still exists between the Arabs and Israel, the latter because it is a territorial water of the U.A.R. Canada has agreed with the Israeli stand that the Security Council declaration of 1951 gave Israel the right of access to the Suez Canal,¹⁹⁷ while the 1957 declaration, signed by 34 maritime nations, opened the Gulf of Aquaba¹⁹⁸. This position has been presented by Canada in the United Nations several times, though Canada has never supported the right of Israel to unilaterally use force to secure these rights.

On three of the important issues then, Canada has emphatically rejected the Arab position, and along with most other western nations supported the Israeli position. On the fourth issue, that of the refugees, the Canadian policy has been a compromise between the Arab and Israeli positions. Canada voted for the 1949 U.N. resolution which affirmed the right of the Palestinians to either return

to their homes or be paid compensation by Israel.¹⁹⁹ This resolution has been reaffirmed at each General Assembly, but Israel has never complied with it and the western nations have been less than enthusiastic about supporting it.

Prior to the 1956 crisis Canada had adopted the stand that there should be limited repatriation, some compensation paid by Israel, and an international effort to resettle the remaining refugees.²⁰⁰ This appears to have been the Canadian position up to 1967, when in September of that year the most explicit statement of the Canadian position was outlined by the Minister for External Affairs Paul Martin.

I wish to say a special word concerning the refugees It is essential that justice be done to the rights and claims of the refugees in the framework of a general settlement. The principles of compensation, repatriation and resettlement enunciated in previous resolutions of our Assembly provide the necessary guidelines for settling the refugees in permanent homes.²⁰¹

He went on to call for a coordinated plan of international action which would have to have the cooperation of all the countries of the Middle East. The plan would look at development from all aspects, agricultural, mineral, and industrial.²⁰² This statement appears to remain the basis for Canadian policy on the issue.

The Canadian stand regarding the refugees is a

compromise between the Israeli position of no compensation or repatriation, and the Arab stand that all must be allowed to go home. It recognizes the reality of the Palestinian position. They have been displaced by the Israelis and it is now impossible for them all to return. Their homes and businesses for the most part no longer exist. Similarly, compensation without permanent settlement and opportunities would be worse than useless. Taking into account all of these problems one must describe the Canadian position as constructive and realistic.

Close examination of Canadian policy toward the crucial Middle East issues reveals that in most instances Canada has supported Israel. On the issues of the right of Israel to exist, territorial control of Palestine, and navigation rights, Canada has been most explicit in her support, while on the issue of the refugees she has supported a compromise. It is difficult to characterize Canadian policy as anything but pro-Israeli. The obvious question which arises from this characterization is that of its relevance to the more general objectives of Canadian foreign policy, and what pressures brought it about.

The positions adopted by Canada on crucial Middle East issues during each crisis were the result of specific internal and external pressures on Canadian foreign policy.

The internal pressures were dealt with primarily at the end of chapter one. A large domestic Jewish community coupled with a substantial body of influential non-Jewish Canadians were quite successful in lobbying for the Israeli cause, despite the fact that the Jewish vote is decisive in only one or two domestic ridings.²⁰³ This domestic support was not re-examined extensively in chapters two or three, but there is little doubt that the basically sympathetic attitude of the Canadian people for Israel continued. It is doubtful if Canadian politicians would have continued to make very flattering speeches and remarks about Israel if the Canadian public were generally anti-Israeli.²⁰⁴ During the 1956 crisis there was public awareness and debate, but it generally dealt with Canadian relations vis-a-vis Britain and the United States rather than any change of attitude toward a country of the Middle East. The crisis of 1967 did not bring about the domestic furor of 1956 and it is difficult to ascertain the exact feelings of the public. Influential newspapers such as The Globe and Mail supported the Israeli position, but beyond this there is little on which to base an opinion.²⁰⁵ It is probably safe to say that the generally pro-Israeli position continued in 1967.

Of more importance were certain external considerations which have had considerable influence on Canadian

policy. With the exception of NATO, these basic external considerations were presented in the Gray Lectures in 1947 by the then Minister of External Affairs Mr. Louis St. Laurent.²⁰⁶ He emphasized Canadian relations with the Commonwealth, the United States, and the United Nations. A year later in a speech to the House of Commons he also emphasized the need for a regional defense agreement among the free peoples of the West.²⁰⁷ This completed the four important external considerations of Canadian policy.

It is quite obvious in his two speeches that Mr. St. Laurent considered good relations with the Commonwealth and the United States to be essential - the former because of historical connections and tradition, the latter presumably because of geographical proximity. Mr. St. Laurent explained that we should "emphasize our readiness to accept responsibility as a North American nation in enterprises which are for the welfare of this continent."²⁰⁸ This could only be interpreted as asserting that Canada would be cooperating more closely with the United States on issues of defense and trade.

This attitude was partially a recognition of geographical reality, but it was also an ideological reaction. In the same speeches Mr. St. Laurent emphasized the idea of free peoples and democracy. Canada viewed the Soviet Union and its ideology as a threat and was prepared

to act in concert with the other western nations to counter this threat. The result was NATO and close connections with the other western nations on policy. While this inevitably meant a shift in emphasis away from the United Nations it did not mean that the United Nations was to be abandoned as a major external consideration of Canadian foreign policy. It simply meant a change in emphasis which will be discussed below. In 1948 then, these four relationships were the primary external considerations impinging on Canadian foreign policy.

The policies pursued by Canada in the United Nations regarding Palestine have quite accurately reflected these concerns. In fact, in 1947 a vote for the partition of Palestine presented a conjunction of all four concerns. It placed Canada in concert with her western allies, did not appear to offend the Commonwealth nations (most were still non-Asian at this time), and appeared to enhance the prestige of the U.N. at the same time. With the added domestic pressure it is little wonder that Canada voted in favour of partition.

In 1956 the situation was somewhat different. The conjunction of interests was not so explicit. In fact it was a matter of reconciling certain external forces which made the Canadian position so difficult. The U.S. was split with the other two major members of NATO, Britain,

and France. The Commonwealth was split along racial lines, the non-Anglo-Saxon Asian nations opposing Britain and France. The U.N. was not split, the two superpowers both agreeing that the British and French should withdraw. The eventual solution was as consistent as possible with the primary external considerations of Canadian policy. It eventually healed the western split, enhanced the prestige of the U.N., and at least preserved the Commonwealth.

The crisis of 1967 was different again. The split in the Commonwealth was evident but not as severe as 1956. The chief difference was the relative solidarity of the West, France excepted, as compared to 1956. While Canada pushed for a U.N. settlement the U.N. was singularly ineffective in 1967 as compared to 1956. The important aspect of this analysis is the fact that the Canadian government appeared to perceive the four external considerations outlined in 1947-48, the U.S., NATO, the U.N., and the Commonwealth, as important in the decisions about policy. It would appear to be a fair assessment that the order above is probably the order of importance of impact of the four external forces. In any case, Canadian policy toward the Middle East appears to have been planned with considerable attention to these four external considerations.

Having examined the impact of Canadian decisions on the Middle East, and how those decisions were arrived at,

it only remains to assess the impact of Canada's Middle East involvement on Canadian foreign policy directions. The major result of this involvement was the elevation of the concept of peacekeeping to a position of major importance in Canadian foreign policy. At the end of World War II Canada had placed high hopes in the ability of the United Nations to keep the peace. This optimism was primarily based on the cooperation between the wartime allies and their agreement on the worth of a United Nations. By 1947 this optimism had changed to disillusionment caused by the increasing friction between the Western nations and the Communist bloc countries. This basic disagreement manifested itself in the United Nations where the Soviet Union used its veto in the Security Council to counter what it perceived as a hostile western majority in the General Assembly. The result was a United Nations which was unable to operate when conflicts arose between the two blocs.

Though the Canadian government was disillusioned it did not abandon the United Nations. Instead it began to search for other functions which the United Nations could perform within the political sphere. In 1948, External Affairs Minister St. Laurent outlined the view that the United Nations could be effective in settling disputes which did not directly involve the power blocs. The two examples he used at the time were Indonesia and Kashmir.²⁰⁹

Later in 1948 and 1949, the type of U.N. action envisaged by St. Laurent was partially successful in Palestine. However, the role being played by the United Nations was that of observer rather than peacekeeper. In the former role observer units are dispatched by the United Nations to report on truce violations and other incidents in a trouble spot, relying on the prestige of the United Nations to keep the situation peaceful. Peacekeeping requires an actual force of armed soldiers who interpose themselves between two armies after the two contending governments have agreed to this arrangement. The former may keep the peace by moral persuasion; the latter can rely to a degree on physical force. During the period 1949-1956, Canada participated in several observer operations.

The impact of the 1956 crisis was to operationalize the role of peacekeeper. In its role as initiator and contributor to the U.N. force, Canada played a major role in this operationalization. The concept of UNEF was widely acclaimed in the world and in Canada at the time. In 1957 the newly-elected Conservative government continued to support the peacekeeping concept, albeit with somewhat less enthusiasm than the Liberal government.²¹⁰

With the return of the Liberals and Mr. Pearson in 1963 the peacekeeping function was raised to a new position

The 1964 White Paper on Defense gave peacekeeping a major priority, and the integration of the armed forces was partially directed toward peacekeeping functions.²¹¹ Given the success of the 1956 peacekeeping operation, the continued participation in peacekeeping by the Conservative government, and the elevation of peacekeeping to a principle of Canadian policy in 1964, it is reasonable to conclude that Canadian participation in the Middle East crisis of 1956 resulted in a new facet, if not direction, of Canadian foreign policy.

If the 1956 Middle East crisis elevated peacekeeping to a significant principle of Canadian policy, what was the effect of the removal of UNEF in 1967? Unfortunately there is little solid evidence on which to base an opinion in this case. It is obvious that the 1970 White Paper on Foreign Policy downgrades the type of peacekeeping that was utilised in 1956 and re-emphasized in the 1964 White Paper. The reasons given in the 1970 White Paper for this switch in emphasis are, (a) the end of rapid decolonisation in the world, and (b) the fact that future strife will probably be of the intra-national type, rather than international. The White Paper argues that the latter does not readily lend itself to the type of peacekeeping force used in the Middle East, and the former implies that there will be fewer types of situations which can be handled by

peacekeeping forces. It concludes that more observer-type units will probably be requested in the future.²¹²

The White Paper does not mention the withdrawal of UNEF and the reasons it gives for the change in emphasis on peacekeeping are certainly arguable positions, if not entirely convincing ones. Perhaps the Viet Nam conflict has influenced North American thinking in the sense that wars of liberation are the only type expected in the future. However, there are certainly many flashpoints around the world which could require a peacekeeping force.

Nevertheless there is little evidence that the reasons advanced by the White Paper are not the sole reasons why Canada has de-emphasized peacekeeping. It would be simple to hypothesize that the withdrawal of UNEF in 1967, amid the bitter feelings of the Canadian government, gave rise to the feeling that this type of operation was useless. But public statements do not support this analysis. The speeches given between 1967 and 1970 do show a difference of emphasis between Mr. Martin and the new External Affairs Minister Mr. Sharp, but it is difficult to assess the reasons for the difference. It could simply be the result of having a new government. While there is solid evidence that Canada's participation in the crisis of 1956 gave rise to a change in Canadian foreign policy regarding peacekeeping, there is no conclusive evidence that the 1967 withdrawal of UNEF

caused its demise.

In a sense, Canadian participation in the Middle East has been an accurate indicator of the influence Canada has had in the post-war world. Immediately after World War II when Canada was just beginning to expand her external contacts she exerted very little influence on the Palestine settlement of 1947-49. By 1956 the Canadian position had been artificially expanded in world affairs due to a combination of circumstances.²¹³ This was reflected in the major part which Canada played in the settlement of 1956. By 1967 the peculiar circumstances which had allowed Canada to exert undue influence in the world community had changed again and when Canada attempted to play a major role in the 1967 crisis she was unable to.²¹⁴ One need only look to the Canadian role in the Middle East to chart the rise and fall of Canadian influence.

In conclusion, it is evident that Canadian policy toward the Middle East has been constrained within certain parameters created by pressures both internal and external. However, it is also evident that Canada has not adequately explored the available possibilities within those parameters. She has tended to shape her policy in a passive way rather than dynamically searching for alternatives. This is not to assert that the Middle East has simply been waiting for a Canadian solution to its problems, but in her present

position of sterile, predictable support for Israel, Canada is left with virtually no influence on any state.

There are many other areas of initiatives that could be explored, especially in the area of imaginative solutions of the refugee problem. This might include an offer to accept a substantial number of refugees as immigrants to Canada. Though the superpowers must agree to any eventual solution, their solid commitments in the area leave them little room for maneuver. An imaginative initiative by a smaller power, which in the past had been largely committed to one side, could be the break needed to effect a settlement. Canada could be that nation.

FOOTNOTES

¹⁹⁰U.N., G.A., Third Session (1948), O.R., First Committee, 206 meeting, p. 690.

¹⁹¹Can., S. & S., 56/10.

¹⁹²Can., S. & S., 67/30.

¹⁹³U.N., G.A., Third Session (1948), O.R., First Committee, 206 meeting, p. 690.

¹⁹⁴Can., S. & S., 56/10.

¹⁹⁵Can., S. & S., 57/7.

¹⁹⁶Can., H. of C., Debates., Vol. , June 8, 1967, pp.

¹⁹⁷Bell, p. 254.

¹⁹⁸Burdett, pp. 246, 247.

¹⁹⁹Khoury, p. 126.

²⁰⁰Can., S. & S., 56/10.

²⁰¹Can., S. & S., 67/30.

²⁰²Ibid.

²⁰³David C. Corbett, Canada's Immigration Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), p. 63.

²⁰⁴See footnote 77.

²⁰⁵The Globe and Mail, June 7, 1967, p. 6.

²⁰⁶R.A. Mackay (ed.), Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1971), pp. 388-401.

²⁰⁷Can., S. & S., 48/23.

²⁰⁸Mackay, p. 395.

²⁰⁹Can., S. & S., 48/61.

²¹⁰Taylor, pp. 145, 153.

²¹¹Ibid., pp. 50, 51.

²¹²Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians, United Nations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), pp. 15-17.

²¹³Granatstein, pp. 50-52.

²¹⁴Ibid., pp. 95-97.

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